Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 32

Issue 2

Article 8

1982

Amending Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
Charles S. Konigsberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles S. Konigsberg, Amending Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 32 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 500
(1982)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol32/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

AMENDING SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
In 1980, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, the Supreme Court refused to declare a
municipalelectoralsystem unconstitutionalfor"minority vote dilution." Theplurality
opinion citedplaitiffs'failureto prove discriminatorypurpose.Opposition to the
judgment in Bolden generated aproposalto add a "resultstest" to section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. As part ofH. 3112, the House version of the Voting
Rights Extension Bill, a resultstest overwhelminglypassedthe House ofRepresentatives in October 1981. The House version of the results test was subsequently introduced in the Senate aspart of S. 1992. During the course of the Senate Judiciary
Committee's consideration of the bill, this Note was drafted in order to provide a
clear explanation of. (1) what the then existing law was regardingvote dilution;(2)
how the results test conceivably could alter that law; (3) whether the results test
would be constitutional;and (4) whether enactment of the results test was advisable
as a matter of public policy. On May 4, 1982 the Senate Judiciary Committee
adoptednew languageforthe amendment to section 2 and voted to reportthis revised
version of S.1992 to thefull Senate. 4 new section was then addedto the endof this
Note, which analyzes the revisedlanguageofS. 1992. The revised version ofS. 1992
subsequently was passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives and was
signedinto law by President Reagan on June 29, 1982.*
Editor'sNote: All references to "Section 2" in this Note refer to Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as it existed prior to June 29, 1982, when President
Reagan signed into law the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982.

INTRODUCTION

of 19651 is most often employed in
THE VOTING Rights Act
the federal preclearance 2 of voting law changes in jurisdictions
specially designated for their history of voting discrimination.3
*

Pub. L. No. 97-205.

1. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973-1973bb-1 (1976)).
2. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). For a discussion of the
operation of the § 5 preclearance provision, see infra text accompanying notes 73-74.
3. Id. § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)-(e) (1976). The § 4 coverage formula is designed to
apply the § 5 preclearance provisions to jurisdictions which discriminated against blacks in
either the 1964 or the 1968 presidential elections. The specified discrimination is defined as
a utilization of "tests or devices" which conditioned voting or registration on reading and
writing ability, knowledge, oral character, or voucher of one's qualifications by an already
registered voter. Id. § 4(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1976). Use of these tests or devices by a
jurisdiction in either the 1965 or the 1968 election, plus a turnout of less than 50% of the
voting age population or registration of less than 50% of that population, "triggers" the
application of the special coverage provisions to a state or political subdivision. Id. § 4(b),
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976). In 1975, Congress extended § 5 preclearance to jurisdictions
which discriminated against languageminorities in the 1972 presidential election. Pub. L.
No. 94-73, §§ 202-204, 89 Stat. 400, 401-02 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1976)).
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The Voting Rights Act, however, also contains a general litigation
section-section 2-which outlaws voting discrimination in all
states and localities:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or4
in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2).
Thus, while the special provisions of the Voting Rights Act preclude discriminatory voting law changes in the specially covered
jurisdictions, section 2 has the legal effect of first, prohibiting dis-

criminatory voting laws in jurisdictions not covered by the
preclearance provisions and second, prohibiting the perpetuation
of discriminatory voting laws enacted by the specially covered ju-

risdictions prior to application of the preclearance provisions.5
House of Representatives Bill 3112,6 passed by the House on
October 5, 1981, proposes to amend section 2.7 The House Committee on the Judiciary, in its committee report on H.R. 3112, contends that "[p]rior to [1980], a violation of Section 2 could be

established by direct or indirect evidence concerning the context,
nature and result of the practices at issue."8 In 1980, however, the
Supreme Court in City of Mobile v. Bolden9 refused to declare a

municipal electoral system unconstitutional for vote dilution-the
This discrimination is defined by the existence of three conditions in a jurisdiction during
the 1972 election: (1) members of a single language minority comprised more than 5% of
the voting age population; (2) less than 50% of the voting age population turned out for or
registered to vote in the election; and (3) the jurisdiction only provided registration and/or
voting materials in English. Id. Application of preclearance to jurisdictions covered under
the § 4 formula is designed to be temporary. For an explanation of how covered jurisdictions may "bal-out" of the special coverage, see infra note 229.
4. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976). The "guarantees set forth
in section 4(0(2)" assure against any denial or abridgement of the right to vote because the
voter is a member of a language minority. Id. § 4(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(0(2) (1976). The
italicized portion of § 2, which was added by amendment in 1975, extended that section's
protections to a new group of persons, namely, members of language minorities. See S.
REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1975). Language minorities include American Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, or persons of Spanish heritage. Voting Rights Act
of 1965, § 14(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(3) (1976).
5. See H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1981) [hereinafter cited as House
REPORT]. See generally Note, The Voting Rights Act and LocalAt-Large Elections, 67 VA.
L. REv. 1011, 1021-26 (1981) (discussing the kinds of political units affected by § 2 of the

Voting Rights Act).
6. H.R. 3112, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
7. H.R. 3112 was passed by the House of Representatives by a vote of 389 to 24.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1981, at Al, col. 6.
8. House REPORT, supra note 5, at 29.
9. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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plurality basing its decision on plaintiffs' failure to prove discriminatory purpose. 10 The committee report views this holding as an
abrogation of Congress' original intent that a violation of section 2
could be established by showing the discriminatory result of a
challenged voting law." The committee, therefore, recommended
the following amendment of section 2 (words to be deleted are in
brackets and new words added by amendment are in italics):
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision [to deny or abridge] in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of

the United States to vote on account of race or color or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2). Thefact
that members of a minority group have not been elected in numbers equal to the group'sproportionof thepopulation
shall not, in
12
and of itsef, constitute a violation of this section.

The amendment would "make clear that proof of discriminatory
purpose or intent is not required in cases brought under that provision." 3 Thus, a violation of section 2 would be determined according to what has frequently been called a "results test." In his
dissent to the committee report, Congressman M. Caldwell Butler
noted that adoption of a "results test" warranted a comprehensive
examination of its ramifications instead of the "careless and
hasty" consideration given to the matter by the Committee. 4
This Note is intended to provide the type of analysis which
Congressman Butler saw lacking in the committee report. The
Note begins by examining past Supreme Court decisions in voting
rights cases in an effort to clarify the present status of voting rights
law. 5 The Note continues by analyzing the ramifications which
the results test could have on state and local governments.1 6 The
constitutionality of the results test is then examined,' 7 followed by
an analysis of the political theory underlying the proposed amendment.'" The Note concludes that the proposed addition of the
H.R. 3112 results test to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is ques10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

House REPORT, supra note 5, at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
H.R. 3112, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1981) (emphasis added).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 29.
Id. at 71.
See infra text accompanying notes 22-131.
See infra text accompanying notes 132-207.
See infra text accompanying notes 208-91.
See infra text accompanying notes 292-313.
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tionable both on constitutional grounds 19 and as a matter of political philosophy.20
For an analysisof the enacted version of S. 1992 see the addendum following the conclusion.21
I.

BACKGROUND: EXISTING LAW

Supporters of the original section 222 and proponents of the
results test' both acknowledge that section 2 merely restates the
language of section 1of the fifteenth amendment.2 4 An analysis of
the current legal effect of section 2, therefore, must begin with a
consideration of voting rights cases under the fifteenth
amendment.
A. FY(/Ieenth Amendment Litigation: Prohibitionof Exclusionary
Voting Laws

The Supreme Court's early decisions on the legal effect of the
fifteenth amendment established that the amendment's purpose
was to prevent exclusion from the elective franchise on the basis
of race. In 1875, the Court stated in UnitedStates v. Reeseu" that

before the fifteenth amendment was adopted a state could deny
the vote on account of race, just as it could on account of age,
property, or education. But the amendment had created a new
constitutional right, which guaranteed against racial discrimination in granting the elective franchise.2 6 Following Reese, the
Court has often reiterated that the fifteenth amendment should be
19. See infra text accompanying note 289-91.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 305, 312-13.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 322-48.
22. See Voting Rights: HearingBefore the Comna on the Judiciary,United States Sen-

ate on S 1564, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 208 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen) [hereinafter cited
as Hearingson S, 1564]; see also Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-61.

23. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 105 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's dissent in Bolden supports the idea of a results test. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
24. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
25. 92 U.S. 214 (1875). Reese involved an indictment under §§ 3 and 4 of the Act of
May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, against two of the inspectors of a municipal election in
Kentucky for refusing to receive and count the vote of William Garner, a black. 92 U.S. at
215. The Court held that because §§ 3 and 4 were not confined in their operation to unlawful discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of sevitude, they did not
constitute "appropriate legislation" under Congress' power to enforce the 15th amendment.
Id. at 220. See infra note 28. The Court, therefore, affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of
the indictment. Id. at 221-22.
26. 92 U.S. at 217-18.
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interpreted as prohibiting the outright exclusion of eligible voters
on account of their race.27
Along with that interpretation, the Court has further established that the amendment specifically proscribes purposeful exclusion. In determining whether Congress' power28 to prohibit the
denial or abridgement of voting rights "on account of race" included the authority to legislate the Act of May 31, 1870,29 the
Court in Reese stated, "It is only when the wrongful refusal at
such an election is because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, that Congress can interfere . . . . 3 As the italicized
phrase indicates, the Court has treated the fifteenth amendment
language, "on account of," as meaning "because of." Moreover,
the plain meaning of the31words "on account of' indicates that they
are volitional in nature.
Despite the fifteenth amendment's prohibition of purposefully
exclusionary discrimination, the Court has often held that exclusionary results are dispositive of fifteenth amendment cases. In
1915, the Court in Guinn v. United States32 held a grandfather

clause33 unconstitutional, despite the absence of an express exclu27. See, e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880). The Neal Court stated: "Mhe
adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment had the effect, in law, to remove from the State
Constitution, or render inoperative, that provision which restrictsthe right ofsuffrage to the
white race." Id. at 389 (emphasis added). The italicized language of the Court's opinion
refers to the exclusion of black voters from the voting booth. For a similar statement by the
Court, see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944). For an explicit reference to the
fifteenth amendment in its function of proscribing exclusion, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953). The Terry Court said: "It is apparent that Jaybird activities follow a plan
purposefully designed to exclude Negroes from voting and at the same time to escape the
Fifteenth Amendment's command that the right of citizens to vote shall neither be denied
or abridged on acount of race." Id. at 463-64. See infra note 37 for a discussion of Terry.
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2, which provides "The Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
29. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). ("An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the
United States to vote in the several States of this Union, and for other Purposes").
30. Reese, 92 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Smith reasoned, "By the terms
of the fifteenth amendment, [the right to vote] may not be abridged by any State on account
of race. Under our Constitution the great privilege of the ballot may not be denied a man
by the State because of his color." Id. at 662 (emphasis added). This language manifests
the court's treatment of the fifteenth amendment language, "on account of," as being volitional in nature.
32. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
33. The Oklahoma law in question, an amendment of the Oklahoma Constitution,
provided:
No person shall be registered as an elector of this state or be allowed to vote in
any election herein, unless he be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma; but no person who was, on January 1, 1866, or
any time prior thereto, entitled to vote under any form of government, or who at
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sion, because the law "itself inherently brings [an exclusionary]
result into existence. ' 34 In 1939, in striking down a registration
scheme as unconstitutional, the Court in Lane v. Wilson35 noted
that the practical effect of the registration scheme was to allow
blacks twelve days to reassert improperly-taken constitutional
rights. Thus, the scheme "operated unfairly against the very class
on whose behalf the protection of the Constitution was. . . successfully invoked. 3 6
Similarly, Justice Black announcing the 1953 judgment of the
Court in Terry v. Adams,3 7 looked to "[t]he effect of the whole
procedure, Jaybird primary plus Democratic primary plus general
election,"' 38 in finding a three-step election process violative of

plaintiffs' fifteenth amendment rights. Finally, in the 1960 case of
Gomillion v. Lighfoot,3 9 the Court found a valid cause of action in
the redefinition of municipal boundaries because "if the allegations are established, the inescapable human effect of this essay in
geometry and geography is to dispoil colored citizens, and only
that time resided in some foreign nation, and no lineal descendant of such person,
shall be denied the right to register and vote because of his inability to so read
and write sections of such constitution. Precinct election inspectors having in
charge the registration of electors shall enforce the provisions of this section at the
time of registration, provided registration be required. Should registration be dispensed with, the provisions of this section shall be enforced by the precinct election officer when electors apply for ballots to vote.
Id. at 357. This type of provision is called a grandfather clause because it effectively excluded blacks from their right of suffrage by placing prohibitive requirements on all voters
except those whose ancestors could vote prior to the enactment of the fifteenth amendment.
Prior to the enactment of the fifteenth amendment, only whites could vote in Southern
states.
34. Id. at 364-65.
35. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
36. Id. at 276-77.
37. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Terry involved a question of state action. The suit alleged
that private political primaries held by the Jaybird Association, a white racist political
organization founded in 1889, denied plaintiffs their 15th amendment rights. Id. at 462-63.
Winnners of the Jaybird primaries nearly always ran for office as Democrats and subsequently won the Democratic primaries and the general elections without oppositon. Id. at
463. Because the Democratic primaries and general elections conducted by the State of
Texas had become no more than perfunctory ratifiers of the Jaybird Association's nominations, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding that Texas effectively had
denied plaintiffs their 15th amendment rights to be free from voting discrimination on
account of race. Id. at 469-70. Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton, announced thejudgment of the Court. Justice Clark, joined by Chief Justice Vinson, and
Justices Reed and Jackson, wrote a concurring opinon. Justice Frankfurter wrote an opinon in which he agreed with the finding of a 15th amendment violation, but thought the
Court should place greater restrictions on the district court in affording relief to the plaintiffs upon remand. Justice Minton dissented.
38. Id. at 469-70.
39. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).

C4SE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:500

colored citizens, of their heretofore enjoyed voting rights. 40
Gomillion indicates how the Court's disposition of cases on the
basis of exclusionary results can be reconciled with its interpretation of the fifteenth amendment as prohibiting purposeful exclusion of voters from the right of suffrage. The complaint in
Gomillion alleged that a statute which redefined the city of Tuskegee's municipal boundaries deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights4 1 because it had the effect of removing from the
city all but four or five of Tuskegee's black voters while not removing a single white voter or resident.4 2 The Court held that the
plaintiffs' complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted, reasoning that "[i]f these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be
irresistible. . . that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters . . ... -4 Thus, the "inescapable
effect" of the redefinition of boundaries would lead to the "irresistible" conclusion that the legislature purposefully excluded black
voters from Tuskegee. The Court's holding in Gomillion, therefore, rested on the inference that the legal result of exclusion was
purposefully designed.
Gomillion exemplifies the principle that in cases where black
voters are excluded from their right of suffrage, courts may infer
discriminatory purpose and hence a fifteenth amendment violation. Village ofArlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousingDevelopment Corp.,' though not a fifteenth amendment voting case,
explicitly recognized this inferential nexus between results and
purpose in cases where black voters have been excluded. The
Court in Arlington Heights, citing Guinn, Lane, and Gomillion, indicated that an evidentiary finding of intent could be made relatively easily where a discriminatory pattern, "unexplainable on
grounds other than race," is the result of an apparently neutral
statute.4 5
40. Id. at 347. The Court has held that the 15th amendment nullifies "sophisticated as
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275
(1939).
41. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340. The plaintiffs in Gomillion alleged violations of the
15th amendment right to vote and of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
14th amendment.
42. Id. at 341.
43. Id. at 341.
44. 429 U.S. 252 (1976). For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying
notes 98-100.
45. 429 U.S. at 266. Cf. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945). Regarding jury selection, the Court in Akins stated: "A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be
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The theoretical basis for this inferential nexus between exclusionary results and discriminatory purpose is the common law
principle that a person "must be taken to contemplate the probable consequences" of his or her acts. 6 Applying this principle to
voting rights cases, it is reasonable to assert that a law having the
probable consequence of excluding black voters from their right
of suffrage is intentionally discriminatory. Conversely, it is unreasonable to suggest that a state could specifically exclude black voters from the ballot box without intending to exclude them. Thus,
because the Court seemed to have viewed exclusionary results as
necessarily inferring discriminatory purpose, the issue of whether
the law proscribes discriminatory results, per se, never arose in
cases involving outright exclusion of voters under the fifteenth
amendment.
Congress enacted section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as
a restatement of the fifteenth amendment, 7 and it must, therefore,
be viewed in the context of the Supreme Court's prior fifteenth
amendment decisions. Despite the absence of any purpose-results
issue in those decisions, the Committee Report on H.R. 3112 asserts that Attorney General Katzenbach's testimony at the 1965
hearings4 indicates that section 2 was meant to proscribe discriminatory results independent of discriminatory purpose. The Attorney General did indeed use the words "purpose or effect" in his
testimony, but ambiguously.4 9 However, more significant than the
Id. at
proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race ....
403-04.
46. Townsend v. Wathen, 9 East. 277, 280, 103 Eng. Rep. 579, 580-81 (K.B. 1808).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
48. Hearingson S. 1564, supra note 22. The committee report cites Katzenbach's testimony at House REPORT, supra note 5, 29 n.99.
49. Hearingson S, 1564,supra note 22, at 191. Attorney General Katzenbach used the
phrase "purpose or effect" in the following context:
[Senator Fong:]
Mr. Attorney General, turning to section 2 of the bill which reads as follows:
No voting qualification or procedure shall be imposed or applied to deny or
abridge the right to vote on account of race or colorthere is no definition of the word "procedure" here. I am a little afraid that there
may be certain practices that you may not be able to include in the word "procedure."
For example, if there should be a certain statute in a State that says the registration office shall be open only I day in 3, or that the hours will be so restricted, I
do not think you can bring such a statute under the word "procedure." Could
you?
Attorney General Katzenbach: I would suppose that you could if it had that
purpose. I had thought of the word "procedure" as including any kind of practice
of that kind if its purpose or efect was to deny or abridge the right to vote on
account of race or color.
Id. (emphasis added). The committee report cites the italicized language of the exchange
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ambiguity is that until this time, interpretations of the fifteenth
amendment uniformly had viewed exclusionary voting laws in

light of a purpose-results nexus.5 0 Thus, it is unlikely that Congress intended, when originally enacting section 2, to proscribe
discriminatory results as conceived by H.R. 3112, for the concept
of discriminatory results as independent of discriminatory purpose, had not arisen under the fifteenth amendment, which section
2 was designed to restate. 5
B.

FourteenthAmendment Litigation.: Voting Strength and the
Idea of Vote Diluton

The roots of the current legislation, designed to add a results
test to section 2, cannot be found in a clarification of the original
intent of Congress, as the Committee Report on H.R. 3112 asserts.
Rather, the H.R. 3112 results test is rooted in a relatively new ap-

plication of the fourteenth amendment.
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in response to the out-

right exclusion of black voters from their right of suffrage.

2

The

between Senator Fong and Attorney General Katzenbach as evidence of Congress' original
intention to include a results test in the meaning of § 2. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at
29. As the quoted section of the testimony indicates, however, Attorney General Katzenbach's reference to "purpose or effects" was extremely ambiguous. First, Katzenbach did
mention an effect standard, but in the previous sentence he answered Senator Fong's inquiry by referring to a "purpose" standard. Second, in the very sentence where he discussed "effect," Katzenbach also referred to the constitutional standard of prohibiting
discrimination "on account of' race; "on account of' is clearly a volitional standard. See
supra text accompanying notes 28-31. Third, in saying "purpose or effect," Katzenbach
may very well have been unintentionally referring to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
which is the only section of the Act that contains that standard. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Katzenbach made his "purpose or
effect" comment in the context of a discussion about what types of laws fall within the
scope of the procedures regulated by section 2, not in the context of a discussion of what
legal standard a court would apply in determining the legality of those laws.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 25-46.
51. In addition to the context of the purpose-results nexus in 15th amendment litigation, Justice Harlan's dissent to Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), supports the assertion that Congress did not intend that section 2 proscribe discriminatory
results as conceived by H.R. 3112. Justice Harlan argued that Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act with electoralproceduresin mind, not the structureof electoral systems which is
the object of the H.R. 3112 results test. See infra note 75. See also STAFF OF SENATE
SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON VOTING RIGHTS
AcT 22-23 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SuBcOMMITTEE REPORT] (arguing that the inclusion
of an "effects test" in section 5 suggests a deliberate omission of such a test in section 2).

52. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT.
TEN YEARS AFTER 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS]. That Commission stated: "It is important to recall. . . that the frustration of
Federal efforts to ensurefree exercise ofl5th amendment rights led directly to the enforcement mechanisms of the Voting Rights Act." Id. (emphasis added). The "free exercise of
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Act's special preclearance provisions were designed to preempt
states with a history of discrimination from utilizing clever devices
to prevent blacks from voting. 3 With the enactment of the Voting
Rights Act and the consequent decrease in the incidents of outright exclusion of blacks from their elective franchise, 4 a growing
number of suits have been brought focusing on the effectiveness of
minority votes.5" In other words, the focus of voting rights cases

shifted from the right to vote, per se, to the impact of electoral
systems on the strength of that vote. This new line of cases, based

on the fourteenth amendment and focusing on voting strength, are
referred to as "vote dilution" cases.
1. The Concept of Minority Vote Dilution
The roots of the minority vote dilution concept5 6 often are
contended to be in Reynolds v. Sims,5 7 which struck down an electoral system based on "vote dilution."5 But the "vote dilution"
cited by the proponents of the results test-wherein the constitutionality of certain types of electoral structures is attacked as impairing the ability of minorities to elect members of their minority
group to public office-is distinctly different from the vote dilution discussed in Reynolds. The Court in Reynolds struck down
15th amendment rights" is simply another way of referring to the freedom from outright
exclusion from the voting booth. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
53. See supra note 3.
54. For a review of the initial effectiveness of the outright exclusion of blacks from
their franchise, see UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at
39-68.
55. For a review of several recent cases focusing on the effectiveness of minority votes,
see infra text accompanying notes 61-92. See generally Thernstrom, The Odd Evolution of
the Voting RightsAet, PuB. INTERE=ST, Spring 1979, at 49-76 (analyzing the evolution of the
Voting Rights Act from its original emphasis on voting registration to the current emphasis
on voting strength).
56. This Note will distinguish "vote dilution" from "minority vote dilution." "Vote
dilution" will refer to the one-person, one- vote principle set forth in Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), and its progeny. "Minority vote dilution," on the other hand, will refer to
claims that the structure of an electoral system - designedly or otherwise - either diminishes or negates the ability of a bloc voting minority group to elect members of its own
group to public office. See infra text accompanying notes 61-92.
57. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For an example of a proponent of the results test who looks
to Reynolds as the source of the minority vote dilution principle, see Justice Marshall's
dissent in Bolden, 446 U.S. at 116-17.
58. The Court held that the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment invalidated the existing and two legislatively proposed plans for apportionment of seats in the
two houses of the Alabama Legislature because the legislature apportioned neither on a
population basis, nor rationally. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. The equal protection clause ofthe 14th amendment states: "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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districting plans for the Alabama legislature based on a disparity
in population among the districts.5 9 This numerical context of the
Reynolds vote dilution rule is expressly revealed in the Court's
reasoning:
[1]f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part
of the State shall be given two times, or five times, or 10 times
the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it
could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted. .

. Their right to vote is simply not the same right to

.

vote as that of those living in a favored part of the State. Two,
five, or 10 of them must vote before the effect60 of their voting is
equivalent to that of their favored neighbor.
Reynolds, therefore, is not the true origin of the idea of minority
vote dilution upon which the H.R. 3112 results test is based.
Though the words may have been borrowed, the idea is distinct.
In 1965, the Court first introduced the idea of minority vote
dilution as a violation of the fourteenth amendment in Fortson v.
Dorsey.6 1 In that case, the Court held that the creation of multimember districts by Georgia's 1962 Senatorial Reapportionment
Act did not on its face violate the one-person, one-vote principle
set down the previous term in Reynolds. 62 Justice Brennan, however, writing for the Court, went on to make a statement that has
become the oft-cited basis for minority vote dilution claims
(though he acknowledged it as dictum):63 "It might well be that,
designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or
political elements of the voting population."'
In 1966, Justice Brennan cited the Fortson dictum while delivering the opinion of the Court in Burns v. Richardson.65 Although
the Court had based its Fortson holding on the Reynolds one-person, one-vote principle, Justice Brennan conveniently used the
Fortson dictum as an established general rule of constitutional
law,6 6 thus introducing a new cause of action under the fourteenth
amendment.
59. 377 U.S. at 568-69.
60. Id. at 562-63.
61.

379

U.S.

433 (1965).

62. Id. at 438.
63. Id. at 439.
64. Id.
65. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
66. Id. at 89.
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The Court did not base its holdings in Fortson and Burns on
Justice Brennan's idea of vote dilution.67 Minority vote dilution,
therefore, had not yet been dispositive of any case. Two years
after Burns, however, in Allen v. State Board of Elections,6 8 the
Court held that a Mississippi statute which changed a county from
single-member districts to at-large voting for county supervisors
was subject to the section 5 preclearance provisions of the Voting
Rights Act69 because it had the potential of nullifying the ability
of black voters "to elect the candidate of their choice." 7 0 Chief
Justice Warren, using the questionable support of Reynolds,7 argued that a change to at-large voting for county supervisors could
nullify the ability of voters who are members of racial minorities
to elect their preferred candidates just as an absolute prohibition
would.7 2
The holding in Allen did not actually invalidate an electoral
structure, but it did subject the Mississippi at-large electoral law to
the preclearance provisions of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Section 5 prohibits a state or political subdivision, subject to the
special coverage provisions of section 4,73 from implementing a
change in its electoral laws unless it has: (i) obtained a declaratory judgment from the District Court of the District of Columbia
that the change "does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race,
color or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in Section
4(f)(2)"; or (2) submitted the proposed change to the Attorney
General and the Attorney General has not objected to it. 74 As
67. The Court based its Fortson holding on the one-person, one-vote principle. See
supra text accompanying note 62. Likewise, the holding in Burns found: (1) that the creation of multi-member senatorial districts in a Hawaii apportionment plan did not ipso facto
result in invidious discrimination; and (2) that use of the number of registered voters as the
apportionment base did not violate the one-person, one-vote principle because it actually
produced a distribution of legislators not substantially different from that which would
have resulted from the use of the state's voting age population as a guide. Burns, 384 U.S.
at 88, 95-96.
68. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74.
70. 393 U.S. at 569.
71. Id. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
72. 393 U.S. at 569.
73. See suipra note 3.
74. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). Section 5, therefore,
places on covered jurisdictions the burden of proving that a change in their voting laws is
not discriminatory in either purpose or effect. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
328 (1966). For a discussion of the distinction between the constitutional validity of the § 5
"effects test," and the proposed § 2 results test, see infra text accompanying notes 225-229.
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applied to the Allen decision, section 5 gave Mississippi the burden of proving that the multi-member electoral scheme would not
dilute minority votes in the county at issue. Thus, although Allen
was technically a statutory interpretation of section 5, it enabled
the Attorney General or District of Columbia District Court to
invalidate a proposed electoral structure if it might dilute minority
votes.75
2.

The PurposeRequirement

Fortson and Burns, by setting forth the idea of minority vote
dilution, and Allen, by enabling the prohibition of a proposed
electoral structure on the basis of potential minority vote dilution,
together established the precedential foundation for seeking the
disestablishment of state electoral structures on the grounds of minority vote dilution. This is where the purpose-results controversy
really begins. May an electoral structure be challenged success75. Allen addressed the issue of whether the proposed change from district to at-large
voting in a Mississippi county constituted a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" within the meaning of § 5, thus
requiring preclearance before the change could be implemented. 393 U.S. at 550. The
majority held that the structural change from district to at-large voting fell within the purview of§ 5. Justice Harlan asserted in dissent that the language of both §§ 4 and 5 indicate
that Congress intended to confine preclearance to votingprocedures as opposed to the structure of electoral systems. Harlan commented on the provision in § 5 which states that "no
person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with [a] qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure [which, though subject to preclearance, has not been
precleared]":
This remedy served to delimit the meaning of the [preclearance] formula in question. Congress was clearly concerned with changes in procedure with which voters could comply. But a law... which permits all members of the County Board
of Supervisors to run in the entire county and not in smaller districts, does not
require a voter to comply with anything at all, and so does not come within the
scope of the language used by Congress.
Allen, 393 U.S. at 587 (emphasis supplied). Commenting on the language of § 4, Harlan
stated:
In moving against "tests and devices" in § 4, Congress moved only against those
techniques that prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did not attempt
to restructure state governments. The Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly
increasing the sphere of federal intervention beyond that contemplated by § 4,
despite the fact that the two provisions were designed simply to interlock.
Id. at 585-86. But see Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533 (1973), where the Court
stated:
Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation of § 5 in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute. After extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to
extend the Voting Rights Act, during which the Allen case was repeatedly discussed, the Act was extended for five years, without any substantive modification
of § 5 [citation omitted]. We can only conclude, then, that Allen correctly interpreted the congressional design when it held that "the Act gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes 'all action necessary to
make a vote effective.'" 393 U.S., at 565-566.
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fully as violating the fourteenth amendment only if it was purposefully designed to dilute minority votes, or merely where the
result of minority vote dilution is present?
The Court in Whitcomb v. Chavis76 addressed this purpose-results issue for the first time. In Whitcomb, the plaintiffs challenged that part of an Indiana statute which established Marion
County as a multimember district for electing state senators and
representatives. 7 7 The complaint alleged that the Indiana statute
violated the equal protection clause by diluting the votes of blacks
78
and poor persons living in the ghetto area of Marion County.
Plaintiffs argued that minority votes, under the multimember districting scheme, were in effect "cancelled out by [the votes of]
other contrary interest groups."' 79 They cited as evidence the fact
that the ghetto residents' proportion of the legislature did not
equal their proportion of the entire population. Plaintiffs requested the disestablishment of the multimember district, based
on the proposition that if the county were divided into singlemember districts, with the ghetto area constituting one of those
districts, ghetto residents would be assured of electing three state
representatives and one state senator.8 0
The Court rejected that argument stating that the plaintiffs had
failed to show that the establishment of the multimember district
was discriminatorily motivated." The Court reasoned that the
purposeful discrimination necessary to establish a constitutional
violation could not be inferred merely from the absence of pro82
portional representation of ghetto residents in the legislature.
Thus, Whitcomb recognized the concept of minority vote dilution, 3 but placed an important qualification on that concept, by
requiring a showing that the legislature intended to cause such
76. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). Whitcomb involved both allegations of minority vote dilution
and population vote dilution. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of population vote dilution. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented from that portion of the opinion which dealt

with minority vote dilution.
77. 403 U.S. at 127.
78. Id. at 128-29. The equal protection clause is set forth at supra note 58.

79. 403 U.S. at 129.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 149. But V. id. at 177 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas remarked,
"A showing of racial motivation is not necessary when dealing with multi-member districts.... [T]he test for multi-member districts is whether there are invidious effects." Id.

(citations omitted).
82. Id. at 149-53.
83. The Court cited to Fortson and Burns. Id. at 142.
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dilution. A mere showing of the absence of proportional representation of minorities does not, under Whitcomb, establish a constitutional violation.
Two years after Whitcomb, in White v. Regester,8 4 the
Supreme Court upheld a district court order requiring that two
multimember state legislative districts-Dallas County and Bexar
County-be reconstituted into single-member districtsY Although the decision cited Whitcomb with approval,8 6 White gave
conflicting signals as to whether the Court intended to follow the
Whitcomb purpose requirement.
The Court's reasoning in upholding the disestablishment of
Dallas County's multimember electoral scheme clearly follows a
purpose standard. The Court noted the history of official discrimination in Texas and in some of its electoral law requirements.
The dispositive factor for the Court, however, seems to have been
the district court's finding that a white-dominated organization in
effective control of the Democratic Party's slating virtually excluded blacks from the primary selection process.87 The Court's

decision regarding Dallas County, therefore, implicitly rests on
the conclusion that the multimember electoral structure purposefully was used to exclude blacks from public office. Furthermore,

Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in White, explicitly
referred to the case as an example of the purpose standard, in a

later opinion. 8
84. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). White involved both allegations of minority vote dilution
and population vote dilution. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of population vote dilution. Justice White delivered the opinon of the Court. No
Justice dissented from that portion of the opinion which dealt with minority vote dilution.
85. Id. at 765. The Dallas County and Bexar County multimember districts were created as part of a Texas Legislative Redistricting Board plan for the state representatives to
be elected to the 150-member House from 79 single-member and 22 multimember districts.
Id. at 758.
86. Id. at 765-66.
87. The district court had found that since Reconstruction days there had been only
two blacks in the Dallas County delegation to the Texas House of Representatives - the
only black delegates ever slated by the Dallas Committee for Responsible Government.
412 U.S. at 766-67. The Court noted the district court's finding that "it is extremely difficult to secure either a representative seat in the Dallas County delegation or the Democratic primary nomination without the endorsement of the Dallas Committee for
Responsible Government." Id. at 767 n. 11, citing 343 F. Supp. 704, 726.
88. In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, Justice White stated in dissent:
In [White], there was no evidence that Negroes faced official obstacles to registration, voting, and running for office, yet we upheld a finding that they had been
excluded from effective participation in the political process in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause because a multimember districting scheme, in the context of racial voting at the polls, was being used invidiously to prevent Negroes
from being elected to public office. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960),

19821

AMENDING SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

b 1.

It is difficult, however, to construe the Court's opinion upholding the disestablishment of Bexar County's electoral system as adhering to a purpose standard. The Court's decision rested on the
district court's findings with regard to: the history of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in Bexar County; cultural and
language barriers; the absence of proportional representation; and
legislative unresponsiveness to voter needs.8 9 Looking at this "totality of circumstances," the Court upheld the district court's assessment that the Bexar County multimember district "excluded
Mexican-Americans from effective participation in political
life." 90 The Court therefore upheld the lower court's ruling that
single-member districts were required to remedy "the effects of
past and present discrimination against Mexican-Americans." 9'
Whereas the dispositive factor as to Dallas County was the purposeful use of the multimember electoral structure to exclude
blacks from the primary selection process, the disestablishment of
the Bexar County multimember district seems to have been, based
on the idea that proportional representation is a good remedy for
general discrimination. 92
Despite the ambiguities in White, three cases decided in the
late 1970's affirmed the general principle that a plaintiff must show
purposeful discrimination in order to prove that a racially neutral
statute9 3 violates the equal protection clause. Although these
cases were not minority vote dilution cases, the Court implied that
the holdings should apply to voting cases by approvingly referring
to Wright v. Rockefeller 9 4 -a congressional apportionment case
and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), we invalidated electoral systems under
the Fifteenth Amendment not because they erected official obstacles in the path of
Negroes registering, voting, or running for office, but because they were used effectively to deprive the Negro vote of any value. Thus, even though Mobile's
Negro community may register and vote without hindrance, the system of at-large
election of City Commissioners may violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments if it is used purposefully to exclude Negroes from the political

process.
Id. at 102.

89. Id. at 767-69.
90. Id. at 769.
91. Id. at 769 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the "totality of circumstances"
doctrine, see Note, Discriminatory Effects of Elections 4t-Large: The "Totality of Circumstances" Doctrine, 41 ALB. L. REv. 363 (1977).
92. The disestablishment of Bexar County's multimember district in order to produce

proportional representation of its Mexican-American citizens may thus be viewed as a type
of "affirmative action" for past discrimination.
93. A racially neutral statute does not in any way base its classifications on race. See,
eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
94. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). Wright involved an action challenging the constitutionality of
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which required proof of discriminatory purpose.
A 1976 decision, Washington v. Davis,9 5 involved a challenge to

the constitutional validity of a District of Columbia police examination which produced a disproportionately low representation of
blacks on the police force. The Court held that disproportionate
impact, absent a showing of discriminatory purpose, is insufficient
to establish a violation of the equal protection clause.96 Though
relevant, disproportionate impact is not dispositive of fourteenth
amendment claims of racial discrimination. 97
One year after Davis, in Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,9 the Court concisely reiter-

ated the purpose requirement: "[O]fficial action will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or

purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause." 99 The Court then clarified the Davis purpose require-

ment by stating that "racial discrimination is not just another
competing consideration. When there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision,
judicial deference is no longer justified."'00
In 1979, in PersonnelAdministrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,10 the Court stated that "discriminatory purpose" implies
that part of a New York statute apportioning congressional districts lying in New York
County. The suit alleged that the apportionment had been made with racial considerations
in mind and that it therefore violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Id. at
53-54. The plaintiff, however, failed to prove that "the New York Legislature was either
motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial lines." Id. at 56.
Thus, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. Id. at 58. Justices
Douglas and Goldberg each wrote dissenting opinions. Both Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 240 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977), cited Wright with approval.
95. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Stewart joined in the parts of the Court opinions which discussed the purpose requirement.
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
filed a dissenting opinion.
96. Id. at 239.
97. Id. at 242.
98. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the parts of the opinion discussing the
purpose requirement, but dissented in the result. Justice White dissented. Justice Stevens
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
99. Id. at 264-65 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 265 (citations omitted).
101. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice White, filed a concurring opinion. Justice Marshall, joined by
Justice Brennan, filed a dissenting opinion.
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that action had been taken "because of' and not merely "in spite
of' discriminatory effects." 2 The Court then ackowledged that
"when the adverse consequences of a law upon an identifiable
group are.

. .

inevitable.

. .

a strong inference that the adverse

effects were desired can reasonably be drawn."' 0 3 The Court,
however, pointed out that inference is not equivalent to proof' °4
3. City of Mobile v. Bolden
One year after Feeney, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 10 5 the
Court affirmed the purpose requirement for minority vote dilution
cases. Although there was no majority opinion in Bolden, a majority of the justices seemed to agree
that some showing of purpose is
06
required in vote dilution cases.'
Bolden reversed a court of appeals affirmance of a district
court opinion ordering the disestablishment of a multimember
voting scheme in Mobile, Alabama. At the time of the initial action, the City of Mobile had a commission form of government,
composed of three commmissioners elected at-large. 07 Although
one-third of the residents in Mobile were black, no black ever had
been elected to the city commission. 08 Thus, the plaintiffs alleged
that the practice of electing city commissioners at-large unfairly
diluted the voting strength of Mobile's black voters in contravention of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the fifteenth
amendment. 109

Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality, found that because section 2's legislative history indicates that it is essentially a restatement of the fifteenth amendment, section 2 has no independent
102. Id. at 279.
103. Id. at 279 n.25.
104. Id.

105. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
106. Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined. Justice White, in his
dissent, id. at 94-103, ackowledged the validity of the purpose requirement. See Rogers v.
Lodge, 50 U.S.L.W. 5041, 5043 (U.S. July 1, 1982) (No. 80-2100), where Justice White
confirms this interpretation of his Bolden dissent. For an outline of all the concuring and
dissenting opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 122-26.
107. 446 U.S. at 59.
108. Id. at 71. The plurality opinion related: "There have been only three Negro candidates for the City Commission, all in 1973. According to the District Court, the Negro
candidates 'were young, inexperienced, and mounted extremely limited campaigns' and
received only 'modest support from the black community ....
Id. at 73 n.19 (quoting
Bolden v. Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 388 (S.D. Ala. 1976)).
109. Id. at 58.
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Because there had been no purposeful

exclusion of black voters from the voting booth and no hinderance
to black registration, the plurality found that the fifteenth amendment had not been violated."'
In regard to the fourteenth amendment claim, Justice Stewart,
citing Wlhitcomb, White, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney,
stated that the plaintiffs must show purposeful vote dilution in order to prevail. 1 2 Initially, Justice Stewart applied the Feeney
standard: mere foreseeability of disproportionate representation
due to bloc voting in the at-large district is insufficient to establish
114
discriminatory purpose."13 The legislature must set up or retain
the at-large district because of its vote diluting effects, not merely
in spite of them. Justice Stewart concluded that the plaintiffs had
the legislature acted with the requisite disfailed to establish that
1 15
criminatory purpose. '

In reaching his conclusion, Justice Stewart addressed four objective factors relied on by the district court to infer the requisite

discriminatory purpose: (1) the substantial history of racial discrimination in Alabama;" 6 (2) discrimination in municipal employment and in dispensing public services;117 (3) the fact that no
110.

Id. at 60-61.
I11. 446 U.S. at 65. In Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981), ad sub nor.
Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982). Circuit Judge Fay, commenting on Bolden

observed:
Though the plurality would limit the scope of the Fifteenth Amendment to those
situations in which there was official action directly impinging the rights of Blacks
to register or vote, that position did not command a majority. Three dissenting
Justices specifically said the parameters of the Fifteenth Amendment encompasses voting dilution cases in which it is asserted that the system purposefully
limits the access of Blacks to the political process. In his concurrence, Justice
Blackmun agrees with the position taken by Justice White in his dissent, as to the
substantive questions presented, and thereby becomes the fourth member of the
Court to approve of an expansive reading of the Fifteenth Amendment. In his
concurrence, Justice Stevens explicitly states, "I disagree with Mr. Justice Stewart's conclusion for the plurality that the Fifteenth Amendment applies only to
practices that directly affect access to the ballot and hence is totally inapplicable
to the case at bar."
Id. at 1372-73 (quoting Bolden, 446 U.S. at 84 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
112. Id. at 65-70. The plurality opinion asserted that White did not conflict with the
purpose requirement set forth in Whitcomb, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney. Id. at
69. However, as discussed above, supra text accompanying notes 84-92, White is ambiguous in its concurrence with the purpose requirements.
113. 446 U.S. at 72 n.17.
114. For an example of where the Court has found purposeful retention or maintenance of an electoral structure, see Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).

115. 446 U.S. at 73.
116. Id. at 74.
117. Id. at 73-74.
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black ever had been elected commissioner;"' and (4) the mechanics of the at-large system itself." 9 After examining each of these
objective factors, he concluded that none of them provided a sufficient inference of discriminatory purpose. 120 Despite Justice Stewart's clarity insofar as he requires proof of discriminatory purpose,
his plurality opinion gives little guidance as to what objective evidence will prove discriminatory purpose. 121
Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote concurring opinions
while Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. Justice
Blackmun argued that even though purposeful discrimination had
122
been proven, the district court's remedy was inappropriate.
Justice Stevens argued that purposeful discrimination is amenable
to objective proof, but he concluded that the plaintiffs did not

prove it in this instance. 123 Justice White reasoned that purposeful discrimination had been sufficiently proven in the lower
court through the objective factors which the plurality had found
unconvincing. 124 Justice Marshall, agreeing with Justice White
that discriminatory purpose had been established inferentially,

further argued that proof of discriminatory results alone sufficiently establishes an equal protection violation. 125 Justice Bren26
nan agreed with both Justices White and Marshall.'
In sum, the Bolden plurality opinion, taken together with ear118. Id. at 73.
119. Id. at 74.
120. The Court found the history of discrimination in Alabama to be "of limited help
in resolving" the question of purposeful dilution. Id. at 74. Moreover, the Court noted
that discrimination in municipal employment and in the dispensing of public services does
not necessarily prove purposeful discrimination in the establishment of Mobile's electoral
structure. Id. at 74. Further, the Court noted that the absence of any black commissioners
"alone does not work a constitutional deprivation." Id. at 73.
Finally, the Court commented on the mechanics of the at-large system by stating: "[T]hose
features of that electoral system, such as the majority vote requirement, tend naturally to
disadvantage any voting minority ....
They are far from proof that the at- large electoral scheme represents purposeful discrimination against Negro voters." Id. at 74.
121. See Comment, City of Mobile v. Bolden: A Setback in the FihtAgainst Discrimination, 47 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 169 (1980) (confusion that Mobile has created in ascertaining what factual circumstances are sufficient to infer discriminatory purpose discussed).
See generally SuBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 51, at 25-29 (use of inferential evidence to
prove discriminatory intent discussed). The recent case of Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272
(1982), addresses the issue of evidentiary requirements in minority vote dilution cases.
122. 446 U.S. at 80-83.
123. Id. at 83-94.
124. Id. at 94-103.
125. Id. at 103-41.
126. Id. at 94.
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lier precedent, 27 presents the following picture of the status quo
in voting rights law: 1) Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as it
now stands, is simply a restatement of section 1 of the fifteenth
amendment. 28 2) Section 1 of the fifteenth amendment prohibits
the outright exclusion of voters from their elective franchise on
account of race. Because it is unreasonable to suggest that a state
could specifically exclude blacks from the right of suffrage without
so intending, there will always exist an inferential nexus between
exclusionary results and discriminatory purposes. 129 3) The equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides the basis
for minority vote dilution cases. Unlike cases involving the
fifteenth amendment, which protects the rights of minorities to
cast ballots, minority vote dilution cases address the impact of
electoral structures on the ability of minorities to elect members of
their own group. The absence of proportional representation of
minorities, however, is insufficient to invalidate an electoral structure. A minority vote dilution case may succeed only if the electoral structure at issue was purposefully designed or retained 30 to
dilute the votes of minorities. It is unclear, however, what3 factors
are dispositive in proving such a discriminatory purpose.1 1
II.

H.R. 3112:

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE RESULTS TEST

In the Judiciary Committee Report on H.R. 3112, the committee states that "[b]y amending Section 2 of the Act, Congress intends to restore the pre-Bolden understanding of the proper legal
standard which focuses on the result and consequences of an allegedly discriminatory voting or electoral practice rather than the
content or motivation behind it."'1 3 2 This is inaccurate.
Bolden-insofar as it required a showing of discriminatory purpose in minority vote dilution cases-was consistent with prior decisions which had established the purpose requirement. 33 The
127. See supra notes 25-104 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 25-51 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 114 for a case reference involving purposeful retention.
131. See supra notes 52-126 and accompanying text. The issue of what factors are dispositive in proving discriminatory purpose was recently addressed in Rogers v. Lodge, 102
S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
132. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 29-30.
133. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text. But see Note, City of Mobile v.
Bolden: Voter Dilution and New Intent Requirements Under the Ffteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 18 Hous. L. REV.611 (1981) (argues that a close analysis of the cases relied
on by the plurality in Bolden does not show a clearly articulated requirement of purposeful
discrimination). Cf. Comment, The Standardof Proofin At-Large Vote Dilution Discrimi-
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results test, therefore, presents a change in a fairly established rule
of law, not the simple overturning of an anomalous decision as
portrayed by the committee report.
Examining the language of section 2 in its proposed amended
form 134 gives little help in discerning the possible ramifications of
the change the results test would work on existing law. The first
clause of section 2--"[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision. .." 35remains unchanged by the amendment. That clause has already been
interpreted in Allen to encompass electoral structures as well as
electoral procedures. 36 Following this unchanged clause, the
amendment adds the so-called results test: "in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in Section 4(f)(2)." 137 Words
prohibiting an electoral law or a practice which "results in a denial or abridgement of" the right to vote are much too vague to
guide courts in ruling on what exactly is prohibited. Admittedly,
the amendment does add a qualifying sentence to section 2: "The
fact that members of a minority group have not been elected in
numbers equal to the group's proportion of the population shall
not, in and of itself, constitute a violation of this Section."1 38 This
sentence, however, does not alleviate the vagueness as to what is
prohibited and, in fact, contributes to it.139 Thus, because the language of the amendment does not explicitly set forth the objects of
its prohibition, it is necessary to consult other sources to ascertain
the amendment's ramifications.
The House Judiciary Committee's Report on H.R. 3112140 and
court cases which have been decided under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act 4 1 may be inspected for guidance in predicting the prohibitive scope of the results test. Section 5 litigation is relevant
nation CasesAfter City of Mobile v. Bolden, 10 FoRDHAM URB.L.J. 103, 105 (1981) (arguing that the effect of Bolden "has been to increase the stringency of the burden of proof
while reducing the necessary quantum of evidence").
134. See supra text accompanying note 12.
135. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
136. See supra note 75.
137. See supra text accompanying note 12.
138. Id.
139. See infra text accompanying notes 149-52.
140. HoUsE REPORT, supra note 5.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
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because section 5 presently contains a provision analogous to the
results test. 142 Moreover, the committee report states that one purpose of the amendment to section 2 is to make that section consistent with section 5 by adding a results test. 143
A. Multimember ElectoralDistricts
The disestablishment of multimember electoral districts' 44
might be one ramification of the proposed results test. The committee report states that "[n]umerous empirical studies. . . have

found a strong link between at-large elections and lack of minority representation."''

45

The report continues: "Not all at-large

election systems would be prohibited under this amendment, however, but only those which are imposed or applied in a manner
which accomplished a discriminatory result."' 4 6 Thus, the com-

mittee report views "lack of minority representation" as a probable discriminatory result of multimember electoral districts, the
occurrence of which warrants the disestablishment of those electo-

ral districts.
"Lack of minority representation" does not refer to the disenfranchisement of minorities, but to the situation where minorities
are not represented by members of their own minority group.' 4 7
Thus, the assumption underlying the results test is that "propor-

tional representation"''

48

of racial and language minorities by

142. See supra text accompanying note 74. Section 5's analogous provision will be referred to as the "effects test."
143. See HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 28. The committee states:
Under the Voting Rights Act, whether a discriminatory practice or procedure is of
recent origin affects only the mechanism that triggers relief, i.e., litigation [section
2] or preclearance [section 51. The lawfulness of such a practice should not vary
depending upon when it was adopted, i.e., whether it is a change.
Id.
144. The terms "multimember electoral districts" and "at-large elections" will be used
interchangeably. Both refer to electoral structures in which more than one representative is
elected by the same constituency.
145. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30. See, e.g., Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory
Effects ofAt-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 85 (1979).
146. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
147. This is supported by the context in which that phrase is used. The prior sentence
in the committee report discusses vote dilution, not voter exclusion: "Discriminatory election structures can minimize and cancel out minority voting strength as much as prohibiting minorities from registering and voting." Id. See also SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note
51, at 29-32 (results test as a legal standard discussed).
148. "Proportional representation refers to a plan of government which adopts the racial or ethnic group as the primary unit of political representation and apportions seats in
electoral bodies according to the comparative numerical strength of these groups." SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 51, at 32-33.
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members of their own minority group is a desirable goal. This
assumption is supported, ironically, by the inclusion of a disclaimer in the proposed amendment: "The fact that members of a
minority group have not been elected in numbers equal to the
group's proportion of the population shall not, in and of itself,
constitute a violation of this section."14 9 Though the disclaimer
does indeed deny the creation of an absolute right to proportional
representation, the committee report's explanation of the disclaiming language states that a lack of proportional representation
"would be highly relevant" in determining whether the results test
had been violated. 150 This qualification, together with the "in and
of itself" language of the disclaimer,' 5 1 indicates that the absence
of proportional representation plus some extra factor would lead
to a violation.' 52 The amendment's disclaimer of proportional
representation, therefore, is a smoke screen designed to obscure
the desired effect of the results test-that electoral schemes be judicially disestablished if they fail to adhere to some judicially-established degree of proportional representation.
The degree of departure from proportional representation
which would constitute a violation of the amendment is clarified,
to some extent, in a test which the committee report sets forth regarding multimember electoral schemes:
It would be illegal for an at-large election scheme for a particular state or local body to permit a bloc voting majority over a
substantial period of time consistently to defeat minority candidates or candidates 53identified with the interests of a racial or
language minority.'
Thus, the committee report sets up a three-part test for determining whether a multimember electoral district violates the results
test. The electoral scheme would be in violation of the amendment if minority candidates or candidates identified with the interests of minorities are defeated by a bloc voting majority,
consistently, and over a substantial period of time.
The three-part test initially makes another attempt at disclaiming the amendment's creation of a right to proportional represen149. H.R. 3112, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1981).
150. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
151. See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 51, at 35-40.
152. An example of an extra factor would probably be racial bloc voting. See infra text
accompanying note 153. The committee report also lists other objective factors which, presumably, would fulfill the requirement for something extra in addition to a statistical absence of proportional representation. See infra text accompanying notes 161-64.
153. Id.
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tation. By referring to the defeat of "minority candidates or
candidates identified with the interests of a racial or language minority,"' 5 4 the committee report implies that the amendment does
not necessarily create a right of proportional representation, because the results test covers the defeat of sympathetic nonminority
candidates as well as the defeat of minority candidates. This disclaimer of proportional representation, however, fails for three
reasons. First, the committee report explicitly states that a lack of
proportional representation would be "highly relevant" in determining whether the results test had been violated.' 5 5 Second, if
the results test becomes law, the committee report's reference to
"candidates identified with the interests of [minorities]" would be
susceptible to constitutional attack." 6 Finally, the committee report states that the amendment will not require the courts to resolve issues of political identification: "The proposed amendment
avoids highly subjective factors such [as] responsiveness of elected
officials to the minority community."' 5 7 Thus, the disclaimer
clause in the committee report appears to be another smoke screen
designed to obscure the goal of proportional representation underlying the results test. The three-part test, therefore, will be analyzed only in the context of its impact on minority candidates.
The first element-that minority candidates be defeated by a
bloc voting majority-may be viewed as a constant in the formula,
because the existence of racially or ethnically polarized voting is
largely a statistical matter. The second element-that minority
candidates be defeated consistently-may also be viewed as a constant, because consistency is a uniform standard. The third part of
the test, however-that minority candidates be defeated over a
substantial period of time-is a variable standard. The number of
years of consistent defeat of minority candidates by bloc voting
majorities which would trigger the invalidation of a multimember
electoral structure would depend upon judicial construction of the
results test. It is this third element of the three-part test which
would seem to determine how far a multimember electoral structure could stray from the goal of producing proportional represen154. Id.
155. See supra text accompanying note 150.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 306-09.
157. See HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30. But f. Note, Mu/timember Electoral
Systems and the Discriminatory-PurposeStandard- City of Mobile v. Bolden, 12 Tax.
TECH. L. REv. 743, 760-62 (1981) (suggesting that the test for illegality in vote dilution
cases should be lack of responsiveness, rather than discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect).
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tation before it would become susceptible to judicial
disestablishment.
Because the results test has been proposed as an amendment to
section 2 in response to the Bolden decision,' an application of
the three-part test to the factual situation from which Bolden arose
should provide an appropriate example of how the results test
would invalidate a multimember electoral district. Before the
plaintiffs filed their complaint in Bolden, however, only three
black candidates had run for the city commission, all in 1973.119
Under any construction of substantiality, one election cannot be
construed as a "substantial period of time." Thus, Mobile's multimember electoral structure could not be invalidated under the
committee report's three-part test. Yet the House Judiciary Committee may be presumed to have intended that Mobile's multimember electoral structure would be invalidated under the
amendment; indeed, opposition to the Court's overruling of that
electoral structure's disestablishment is what provided the impetus
for the proposed amendment to section 2.160
The solution to the Bolden paradox is that, in addition to the
three-part test for determining when multimember electoral structures would violate the proposed amendment, the committee report sets forth a second test-the objective-factor test. In contrast
to the three-part test which focuses on the defeat of minority candidates, the objective-factor test focuses on the factors which make
up an electoral system:
[In determining] a violation of the section ... other objective
factors ... would be highly relevant ... such as a history of
discrimination affecting the right to vote, racially polarity [sic]
voting which impedes the election opportunities of minority
group members, discriminatory elements of the electoral system
such as at-large elections, a majority vote requirement,[ 16 1] a
prohibition on single-shot voting,[I 62] and numbered posts
which enhance the opportunity for discrimination,[ 163] and discriminatory slating or the failure of minorities to win party
nomination. 64
158. See supra text accompanying notes 7-12.
159. See supra note 108.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 7-12.
161. For a discussion of the majority vote requirement, see infra text accompanying
notes 199-202.
162. For an explanation of single-shot voting, see UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 206-07.
163. For an explanation of numbered posts, see id. at 207.
164. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30. Another factor, indirectly referred to by the
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The committee report cites White v. Regester 6 5 for the objective-factor test.' 6 6 In White, the disestablishment of Bexar
County's multimember district was based on the district court's

inquiry into the "totality of circumstances,"' 67 and its conclusion

that single-member districts were required to remedy the effects of
past and present discrimination. 6 ' But the committee report,

while approving a totality of circumstances inquiry implicitly disclaims any intention to use disestablishment of electoral structures
as a remedy for general discrimination.' 6 9
The objective-factor test appears to manifest the committee's
intention that multimember electoral systems should be struck
down if the totality of circumstances surrounding a particular
electoral process lessens the likelihood of proportional representation. That intention is evidenced in the committee's stated desire
to proscribe processes which "impeded the election opportunities
"I"
Thus, if the electoral proof minority group members ....
cess of Mobile is found to lessen the likelihood of proportional
representation, the examining court could disestablish the multicommittee report in another context, is the annexation of land. Id. at 45. In setting forth
the purpose of the amendment to § 2, the committee report states: "For purposes of this
Section, conduct which has the effect, impact or consequence of discrimination on the basis
of race, color, or member [sic] in a language minority group would be in violation of Section 2 of the Act." Id. (citing Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975)). Richmond
involved an action under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act for a declaratory judgment that
Richmond, Virginia's annexation of some adjacent county land did not have the purpose
and would not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of color.
The Court in Richmond held, in part, that the annexation did not constitute a discriminatory effect under § 5, but only because Richmond accompanied the annexation with the
replacement of Richmond's at-large election of councilmen with a ward system. 422 U.S.
at 370. Thus, Richmond indicates that land annexations will be viewed under the Voting
Rights Act as a factor constituting a discriminatory effect because of their ability to reduce
the proportion which minorities constitute in a city's population. See, e.g., id. at 372. See
generally Weiner, Boundary Changes and the Power ofthe Vote, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 959
(1977) (part of a symposium on local government boundary practices which disadvantage
minorities).
165. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
166. House REPORT, supra note 5, at 30 n.104 (1981).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 84-92.
168. 412 U.S. at 769 (citation omitted).
169. To remedy general discrimination, a court would have to determine whether
elected officials had been responsive to the needs and interests of minorities. The committee report, however, is unwilling to have courts make such judgments. The committee,
therefore, must not intend the results test to remedy general discrimination.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
170. Id. The results test section of the committee report focuses on the tendency of
various electoral structures to promote or impede proportional representation. See supra
text accompanying notes 145-52.
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member electoral structure on the grounds that it violates the results test.
Multimember election districts, therefore, could be attacked as

violative of the results test under either of two theories: (1) that
minority candidates have been defeated by bloc voting majorities,

consistently, and over a substantial period of time;' or (2) that
certain objective factors have effectively lessened the likelihood of
proportional representation in the multimember district.172 Since
a majority of the municipalities in the country conduct at-large
elections of their city commissions or council members, 173 the

ramifications of a results test could be significant.
B. Establishment of ElectoralDistricts
The committee report also states that the results test would
have an impact on the states' establishment of legislative and congressional electoral districts. The amendment to section 2 uses the

same three-part test for determining whether a districting plan or
a multimember district violates the results test.' 7 4 The test for districting, however, adds the phrase: "or in other ways denies equal
access to the political process . . .,. Since the denial of equal
access refers to the objective-factor test, 76 the courts could scrutinize districting plans with the same latitude that the objective-fac-

tor test allows them in scrutinizing multimember electoral
systems. 177
Cases decided under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act178 provide concrete examples of how the section 2 proportionality re-

quirement might operate in the establishment of electoral districts.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 158-70.
173. 1979 MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 98-99 (Table 4/2) (figures accurate as of 1977).
174. "A districting plan which [permits a bloc voting majority over a substantial period
of time consistently to defeat minority candidates or candidates identified with the interests
of a racial or language majority] ... or in other ways denies equal access to the political
process would... be illegal." HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30-31. The portion of the
quote set in brackets has been placed there because the original sentence in the committee
report begins with the phrase: "A districting plan which suffers from these defects ....
These defects refers to the three-part test elucidated in the immediately preceding sentence.
See generaly Note, Group Representation and Race-ConsciousApportionment: The Roles of
States andthe FederalCourts, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1847 (1978) (issues that arise when racial
considerations become intertwined with apportionment decisions of legislators and courts
discussed).
175. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30-31.
176. See infra text accompanying notes 244-58.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 161-70.
178. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
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Section 5 cases are helpful because the section 2 results test is
analogous to the section 5 "effects" test. 7 9 UnitedJewish Organizations of Williamsburg,Inc. v. Carey,18 0 a section 5 case decided
districting might be manin 1977, suggests that race-conscious
181
dated by the section 2 amendment.
UnitedJewish Organizations arose from New York's efforts to

have the Attorney General preclear its redistricting plans for
Kings County under section 5. t82 After the Attorney General rejected a New York redistricting plan in 1972, New York officials
met with Justice Department officials to determine what type of

plan would be acceptable. The Justice Department officials suggested that sixty-five percent non-white majorities in two assembly
districts and two state senate districts would be acceptable.'83 As a

consequence, the Hasidic Jewish Community in Kings County

was split between two districts.' 8 4 One representative of the
Hasidic community brought suit challenging the use of racial considerations in the establishment of the state electoral districts in
Kings County. Although the holding failed to command a majority opinion, a majority of the Justices found New York's use of

racial considerations in its redistricting to be constitutional.'85 A
plurality of four Justices held the racial gerrymandering to be con-

stitutional because New York was attempting to comply with section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 186 A combination of five Justices
found that New York acted constitutionally on the broader
179. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74. See also supra note 143 and accompanying text.
180. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
181. See id. at 160-62.
182. Id. at 148-49.
183. Id. at 181-82 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 152.
185. By a 7-1 margin the Supreme Court decided that New York had acted constitutionally. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court and filed an opinion in which
Justice Stevens joined. Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Rehnquist joined in parts of Justice White's opinion. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment and filed an opinion in
which Justice Powell joined. Chief Justice Burger dissented. Justice Marshall took no part
in the case.
186. Justice White, joined by Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun, stated:
Petitioners have not shown that New York did more than accede to a position
taken by the Attorney General that was authorized by our constitutionally permissible construction of § 5. New York adopted the 1974 plan because it sought
to comply with the Voting Rights Act. This has been its primary defense of the
plan, which was sustained on that basis by the Court of Appeals.. . . Mhe
Court of Appeals was essentially correct ....
Id. at 164-65. See generally Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the Need to
Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights, 87 YALE L.J. 571 (1978) (analyzes the United Jewish
Organizations plurality opinion and argues that the statutory and constitutional issues
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grounds that its racial gerrymandering did not amount to unconstitutional discrimination against the plaintiffs.'87
UnitedJewish Organizationsdemonstrates that the use of strict

racial gerrymandering by jurisdictions attempting to comply with.
the effects test of section 5 is permissible. By analogy, it can be
presumed that the Court would permit states to draw their legislative and congressional districts on racial lines in order to avoid a
violation of the proposed section 2 results test. s88 Congressman
Butler, in his dissent to the committee report, pointed out that
many states-as a practical matter-would feel pressured to gerand ethnically in order to avoid a
rymander their districts racially
189
test.
results
the
of
violation
The conclusion that section 2 could require racial or ethnic
districting points to an absurdity inherent in the results test. Suppose, for example, that State X is in the process of redistricting its
state senate districts following the 1990 census. Assume that the
census indicates that black voters could have an impact on four
senate races because four districts have substantial black minorities. Assume further that State X's legislature is populated by a
large number of racists. The legislature, therefore, racially gerrymanders the districts to create two state senate districts with black
majorities, thereby minimizing the number of districts influenced
by black voters. Under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, State X's discriminatory purpose in establishing the state senate districts would invalidate the newly created
districts.190
might have been resolved more adequately by recognizing an aggregate voting right for
racial groups under the 15th amendment).

187. Justice White, joined by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist, stated: "Whether or not
the plan was authorized by or was in compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, New
York was free to do what it did as long as it did not violate the Constitution, particularly
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; and we are convinced that neither Amendment
was infringed." Id. at 165. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, stated in his concurrence in the judgment: "Having failed to show that the legislative reapportionment plan
had either the purpose or the effect of discriminating against them on the basis of their
race, the petitioners have offered-no basis for affording them the constitutional relief they
seek." 430 U.S. at 180.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 145-52.
189. Butler stated:
One practical effect of the amended language proposed in H.R. 3112 would. ..
be to require State and local governments to study the effects of all proposed
voting procedures and adopt only those which maximize statistically the voting
impact of minority citizens. Ultimately, this logic could lead to noncontinuous
voting district boundaries, crazy quilt annexation patterns and the like.
HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 72.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 76-115.
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Suppose, however, that State X conducted its redistricting in a
nondiscriminatory atmosphere and that State X maintains the
four districts with substantial black minorities for a variety of
nondiscriminatory reasons. Nevertheless, a private citizen brings
a minority vote dilution suit under the amended section 2 based
upon two theories: first, that black candidates for the state senate
in these four districts have been consistently defeated by a bloc
voting majority over a substantial period of time; and second,
that blacks do not have equal access to the political process under
the objective-factor test.' 91 After a proper showing of proof, a
court finds that State X's establishment of state senate districts is
illegal and orders the establishment of a districting scheme which
will promote proportional representation of blacks in the state
senate. The scheme which a court orders merges the substantial
black minorities in four districts in order to create two state senate
districts with black majorities-the same system which would be
declared unconstitutional in the first hypothetical.
Thus, an amended section 2 would empower a court to order
precisely the same type of racially conscious districting scheme
which it would also be obligated to strike down if set up by a
racist state legislature. This absurdity results from the paradoxical
nature of an amended section 2: on the one hand it would still
prohibit purposeful discrimination in electoral districting, 1 92 but
on the other hand, it would force states-and if states failed,
courts-to maintain a certain degree of proportional representation through the vehicle of districting. The underlying reason for
this paradox is the simple principle of logic that the law cannot
simultaneously say to the states "thou shalt not racially gerrymander" and "thou shalt racially gerrymander."
C.

Other ProhibitedElectoralPractices

1. UnequalAvailability of Absentee Ballots
The committee report states that "a violation would be proved
by showing that election officials made absentee ballots available
to white citizens without a corresponding opportunity being given
to minority citizens similarly situated."' 9 3 This suggests that sec191. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57 and 175-77.
192. Regarding purposeful discrimination, the committee report states, "The alternative standard of proving that a voting practice or procedure is unlawful if a discriminatory
...HousE REpurpose was a motivating factor would still be available to plaintiffs.
PORT, supra note 5, at 30 n.101.
193. Id. at 31 n.105.
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tion 2 must be amended in order to prohibit the unequal availability of absentee ballots. The results test, however, has been
conceived in order to deal with minority vote dilution-the relative strength of minority votes. The opportunity to receive absentee ballots, on the other hand, pertains to the right to vote in the
first place. Since the exclusion of voters from their right of suffrage always infers discriminatory purpose, 194 the unequal distribution of absentee ballots is already illegal under the current

wording of section

2.195

2. Purgingof Voter RegistrationRolls
The committee report further states that "purging of voter registration rolls would violate section 2 if plaintiffs show a result
which demonstrably disadvantages minority voters. Only purges
having a discriminatory result are prohibited."1 96 The purging of
voter registration rolls involves the exclusion of voters from their
right of suffrage, rather than vote dilution; the inability to register,
results in the inability to vote. Since an exclusionary result necessarily infers discriminatory purpose, 197 the purging of voter registration rolls is already illegal under the current wording of section
2.198

3. The Majority Vote Requirement
Finally, the committee report states, "The majority vote requirement would... be prohibited 199 where "a bloc voting majority over a substantial period of time consistently [defeats]
minority candidates or candidates identified with the interests of a
racial or language minority."20 0 The majority vote requirement is
illustrated by the following hypothetical. Assume that in a general election there are two white candidates and a black candidate.
Making the additional assumption that the jurisdiction is 60%
194.
195.
196.
197.

See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
See supra text accompanying note 4.
HoUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31 n.105.
See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.

198. See supra text accompanying note 4.
199. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31 n.105.
200. Id. at 30. This qualification of the majority vote requirement prohibition is based
on the following language of the committee report: "The majority vote requirement would
also be prohibited under the standards applicable to other discriminatory vote dilutions."
Id. at 31 n.105. The standard referred to is the three-part test applied to multimember
districts and establishment of state electoral districts. See supra text accompanying notes

153-57.
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white and 40% black, it is possible with racial bloc voting that in
the general election one white candidate would get 25% of the
vote, the other white candidate would get 35%, and the black candidate would get 40%. A majority vote requirement would force a
runoff between the white candidate who received 35% of the vote
and the black candidate who received 40%. With racial bloc voting the
black candidate would lose the runoff election-60% to
2°

40%.
4%201

The prohibition of a majority vote requirement when it results
in vote dilution seems to provide an alternative to the prohibition
of multimember districts and establishment of electoral districts
along minority lines. Whereas the prohibition of a majority vote
requirement attempts to achieve proportional representation by
enabling a bloc voting minority to win an election by a plurality,
the disestablishment of multimember districts and racial or ethnic
gerrymandering attempt to achieve proportional representation by
the judicial creation of districts in which minorities constitute a
majority. 20 2 The number of actions brought for the disestablishment of multimember districts and racial/ethnic gerrymandering,
because of their greater certainty of achieving proportional representation, would likely overshadow the number of actions brought
to strike down majority vote requirements.
In sum, the addition of the results test to section 2 could lead
to three significant ramifications. 20 ' First, the dominant form of
electing municipal officials, the multimember electoral scheme,
could become the subject of judicial scrutiny in a multiplicity of
suits, based on a vague proportional representation standard. 2 4
Second, the states could be required, in their establishment of leg20 5
islative and congressional districts, to racially and ethnically
gerrymander districts to satisfy a judicially established standard of
proportionality.20 6 Finally, as an alternative to the above two legal
actions against state and local governments, actions could be
brought to invalidate majority vote requirements where election
results violate a judicially established standard of
201. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 206.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 144-92.
203. For a study which predicts some of the possible ramifications of the results test on
states and municipalities, see SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 51, at 46-52.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 144-73.
205. The gerrymandering would be based on the demographics of language minorities
as well as of racial minorities. See supra note 4.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 174-92.
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proportionality. 07
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

In its report on the amendment to section 2, the House Judiciary Committee set forth the two objectives of the results test: the
20 8
prevention of fourteenth and fifteenth amendment violations,
and the remedying of the present effects of past violations. 20 9 The
first objective is certainly a legitimate end. The results test, however, is not an appropriately adapted means to that end because

potentially it could strike down many constitutionally legitimate
state statutes.2 10 The second objective-remedying the present effects of past violations-appears, on its face, to be a legitimate
end, but when examined in the context of the committee report,
the second objective is revealed to be one beyond the scope of the
Constitution. 21' Because the means used to achieve the first objective are constitutionally inappropriate and the second objective
seeks a constitutionally inappropriate
end, the constitutionality of
212
questionable.
is
test
results
the
A.

The Results Test as a Means

In justifying the results test as an appropriate means of enforcing the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, the committee report indicated that since discriminatory purpose is often
concealed, prohibition of voting practices which have a discrimi213
natory result is appropriate.
Fifteenth amendment voting rights cases involve the outright
exclusion of voters from their right of suffrage. 214 In such cases of
exclusion, an inferential nexus exists between the result of exclusion and the prohibited discriminatory purpose. 215 Because of this
inferential nexus, fifteenth amendment violations can be identified
207. See supra text accompanying notes 199-202.
208. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
209. See infra text accompanying note 243.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 213-42.
211. See infra text accompanying notes 243-91.
212. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), where Chief
Justice Marshall stated: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the consti-

tution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." The Court explicitly has applied the McCulloch test to § 5 of the 14th amendment.
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
213. House REPORT, supra note 5, at 31.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 32-46.
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easily. Hence, the justification of the results test as a means of

attacking covert purposeful discrimination must rely on Congress'
fourteenth amendment enforcement powers. z16
In finding authority to enact the results test under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment, the committee's argument manifests
the following reasoning. The equal protection clause of the four-

teenth amendment prohibits the purposeful dilution of minority
voting strength by the states. Because this purposeful discrimination is often concealed, the fourteenth amendment prohibition is

difficult to enforce. The results test, therefore, by prohibiting all
electoral laws which result in vote dilution, will ipso facto prohibit
those laws which were motivated by an unconstitutionalpurpose
to dilute.
This particular assertion of congressional power is potentially
grossly overinclusive.2 17 Many constitutionally legitimate electoral

laws could be struck down, because the absence of proportional
representation-the results test's basis for section 2 violations-does not necessarily infer discriminatory purpose.
The Supreme Court previously has upheld potentially overinclusive congressional legislation. In Oregon v. Mitchell,21 s the
Court upheld Congress' nationwide ban on literacy tests enacted
as part of the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.2 1 9 The
legislation's potential overinclusiveness arose from the uncertainty

over how many of the existing literacy tests had been discriminatorily motivated and from the tenuous assumption that every future literacy test would be discriminatorily motivated.
216. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
217. The statutory quality of overinclusiveness, as discussed in this Note, refers to a
situation where a congressional statute, in the process of prohibiting specified state statutes,
has the legal effect of prohibiting other state statutes which Congress is not constitutionally
empowered to prohibit. For an example of where the word "overinclusiveness" has been
used in this way, see Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Oregon involved constitutional challenges to certain sections

of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970. Although the Court divided on all other
provisions of the 1970 Act, it united in one respect: every Justice found the nationwide
literacy test suspension constitutional. Justice Black, announcing the judgment of the
Court, stated,
I believe that Congress, in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, can prohibit the use of literacy tests or other devices used
to discriminate against voters on account of their race in both state and federal
elections. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, all of my Brethren join me
in this judgment."
Id. at 118.
219. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f) (1976)).
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Justice Douglas, in his own opinion in Mitchell, suggested two
justifications for upholding the nationwide ban. First, in enacting
the literacy test ban, Congress could legitimately "rely on the fact
that most States do not have literacy tests [and] that the tests have
been used at times as a discriminatory weapon against some minorities ... ."z0 Second, Justice Douglas reasoned that the legislation's remedial objective mitigated its overinclusiveness. The
remedial objective of the legislation recognized the past violations
22 1
of many states in providing minorities with equal education.
Because of these violations, it is reasonable to infer that fewer minorities have obtained a given degree of literacy than their white
counterparts. 2 Past equal protection violations, therefore, indirectly caused the inability of minorities to pass the literacy prerequisites to voting. Thus, the literacy test ban stood as a
effects of past state violations
congressional remedy for the present
223
of the equal protection clause.
The results test may be distinguished from both of Justice
Douglas' lines of reasoning. First, unlike the literacy tests, every
state has electoral laws and the number of those electoral laws
which are utilized to exclude minorities from the political process
is unknown. Second, the results test may not be justified as a remedy for the present effects of past discrimination. 22 4 Thus, Mitchell
cannot serve as a precedent for justifying the potentially gross
overinclusiveness of the results test.
22
The Court's 1980 decision in City of Rome v. United States 1
ruled, in part, on the potential overinclusiveness of the effects test
contained in section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.22 6 The section 5
effects test, like the proposed results test, is potentially overinclusive because in pursuing its objective of preventing purposeful discrimination, the effects test could invalidate nondiscriminatorily
motivated electoral laws.227 The Court in Rome reasoned, however, that the scope of section 5 mitigated the risk of its being
overinclusive because the Act applied only to jurisdictions which
220. Id. at 147 (dissenting in part and concurring in part).
221. Id. at 146.
222. Id.

223. See id.
224. See infra text accompanying notes 243-91.
225. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
226. Id. at 160-61. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.

227. Although § 5 does not invalidate electoral laws, it enables the Attorney General
and the District of Columbia District Court to prevent the enactment of certain electoral

laws. See, e.g., supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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have a demonstrable history of voting discrimination. 228 Further,

these jurisdictions can eventually be released from section 5 coverage upon demonstrating that they have not enacted discriminatory
voting laws for a specified number of years. 229 The effects test of
section 5, therefore, unlike the proposed section 2 results test, is
228. 446 U.S. at 177. The Court in Rome cited South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966), as an example of how Congress' factual findings of a demonstrable history of
intentional racial discrimination justified its exercise of remedial powers. The cited passage in South Carolina stated:
The Act suspends new voting regulations pending scrutiny by federal authorities to determine whether their use would violate the Fifteenth Amendment. This
may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional power, as South Carolina
contends, but the Court has recognized that exceptional conditions can justify
legislative measures not otherwise appropriate. . . . Congress knew that some of
the States covered by § 4(b) of the Act had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem
of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees. Congress had reason to suppose that these States might try similar maneuvers in the future in order
to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself. Under
the compulsion of these unique circumstances, Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner.
Id. at 334-35. Thus, like the Court in Rome, the Court in South Carolina stressed that
since Congress' remedial measures had been tailored to remedy instances of purposeful
discrimination, Congress avoided the problem of overinclusiveness. But see McClellan,
Fiddling With the Constitution While Rome Burns- The Case Against the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 42 LA. L. REV. 5, 5-6, 29-43 (1981) (relates that although the City of Rome is part
of a covered state-Georgia--the city, itself, does not have a demonstrable history of discrimination). For an explanation of which jurisdictions are covered by § 5, see supra note 3
and accompanying text.
229. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1976). Section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act currently specifies a period of time after which covered jurisdictions may
be released from the § 5 preclearance provisions and, therefore, the § 5 effects test. The
release, or "bail-out," provision of § 4, as originally enacted, provided that if a covered
jurisdiction could demonstrate to the District of Columbia District Court that it had not
used a "test or device" during the previous five years, it would be released from § 5 coverage. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 438. Since § 4
mandates the suspension of such tests and devices, release from the preclearance provisions
would have been virtually automatic for the covered jurisdictions five years following the
date of the passage of the Act. In 1970, however, Congress lengthened the bail-out period
to 10 years. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 3, 84 Stat. 314,
315. In 1975, Congress lengthened the bail-out period to 17 years. Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 101, 89 Stat. 400, 401. Thus, jurisdictions
covered under the original Voting Rights Act of 1965 are eligible for bail-out beginning on
August 6, 1982, and jurisdictions covered under the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1970 are eligible beginning August 6, 1987. Jurisdictions subject to preclearance due to the
language minority provisions enacted in 1975 are eligible for bail-out upon a declaratory
judgment that they have not used specified tests or devices for 10 years, Thus, those jurisdictions are eligible for bail-out beginning on August 6, 1985. Id. Due to the imminence of
the first bail-out date, August 6, 1982, Congress is currently considering amending the bailout provisions of § 4 of the Voting Rights Act. See H.R. 3112, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1
(1981); S. 1992, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1981).
Editor's Note: The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 signed into law by President Reagan on June 29, 1982 has postponed the bail-out dates for covered jurisdictions.
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tailored-both in scope and duration-to mitigate potential
overinclusiveness.
Shortly after Rome, the Court faced another potentially overinclusive statute in Fullilove v. Klutznick. 23 ° The plaintiffs in Full!love challenged the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (1977

Act). 3 1 The 1977 Act required that, absent an administrative
waiver, at least ten percent of federal funds granted for local public works projects must be used by the state or local grantee to
procure services or supplies from businesses owned by minority
group members. 2 Chief Justice Burger, in his plurality opinion,
explained that the 1977 Act purported to remedy the present effects of past discrimination against minority businesses. 2 33 Accordingly, Congress enacted the 1977 Act to ensure that those

traditional procurement practices would not perpetuate past
discrimination.
Nonminority contractors, however, claimed that the 1977 Act

should fail for overinclusiveness because it "bestows a benefit on
businesses identified by racial or ethnic criteria which cannot be
justified on the basis of competitive criteria or as a remedy for the
present effects of identified prior discrimination. 2 34 The
Court,23 5 nevertheless, upheld the 1977 Act. Chief Justice Burger
suggested two factors which mitigated the Act's potential overinclusiveness. First, Congress carefully tailored the administrative
procedures under the 1977 Act to accomplish the Act's remedial
objectives." 6 Second, the limited duration of the program miti230. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
231. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116.
232. Id.
233. 448 U.S. at 478.
234. Id. at 486.
235. Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Justices White and Powell joined. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment and filed an opinion in which Justices Brennan
and Blackmun joined. Justice Stewart dissented and filed an opinion in which Justice
Rehnquist joined. Justice Stevens fied a dissenting opinion.
236. The Court stated:
There is administrative scrutiny to identify and eliminate from participation in
the program MBE's [minority business enterprises] who are not "bona-fide"
within the regulations and guidelines .... And even as to the specific contract
awards, waiver is available to avoid dealing with an MBE who is attempting to
exploit the remedial aspects of the program by charging an unreasonable price,
i.e., a price not attributable to the present effects of past discrimination. ...
Grantees are given the opportunity to demonstrate that their best efforts will
not succeed or have not succeeded in achieving the statutory 10% target for minority firm participants within the limitation of the program's remedial objectives.
In these circumstances a waiver is available once compliance has been demon-
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gated the potential overinclusiveness of the 1977 Act. Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the 10% requirement "may be viewed
as a pilot project, appropriately limited in extent and duration,
by the Congress
and subject to reassessment and reevaluation
237
prior to any extension or re-enactment.
Neither of these two mitigating factors apply to the potentially
severe overinclusiveness of a section 2 results test. The proposed
amendment to section 2 does not provide any administrative procedures which could tailor the results test's prohibition to electoral
structures involving a risk of purposeful discrimination.2 3 8 Thus,
the results test would apply to every state's electoral structure.
Moreover, unlike the duration of the 1977 Act in Fullilove,2 39 the
duration of the results test is unlimited.24
In sum, Congress' objective of preventing purposeful minority
vote dilution under the fourteenth amendment is a legitimate end.
This legitimate end, however, does not justify the enactment of an
inappropriate means-the potentially overinclusive results test.
241
The results test is overinclusive because unlike existing law,
which requires that all evidence in voting rights cases be designed
to prove purposeful discrimination, the primary legal objectives 2of
42
the results test are unrelated to proving discriminatory purpose.
The results test, therefore, could strike down a great many constitutionally legitimate electoral laws-laws which are not purposefully discriminatory. Since none of the mitigating factors which
helped to overcome objections to overinclusiveness in Oregon,
Rome, and Fullilove apply to the results test's overinclusiveness,
the constitutionality of the results test as a means is questionable.
B.

The Results Test as an End

The other constitutional basis which the committee report cites
for a results test is the objective of remedying the present effects of
past purposeful discrimination:
strated. A waiver may be granted at any time during the contracting process, or
even prior to letting contracts if the facts warrant.
448 U.S. at 487-88.
237. Id. at 489 (footnote omitted).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 132-207. Section 5 may be distinguished from
§ 2 precisely bebause it is tailored to the prohibition of electoral laws involving a risk of
purposeful discrimination. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
239. See supra text accompanying note 237.
240. SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 44-45.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 22-131.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
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Voting practices which have a discriminatory result also frequently perpetuate the effects of past purposeful discrimination,
and continue the denial to minorities of equal access to the
political processes which was commenced in an era in which
minorities were purposefully excluded from opportunities to
register and vote. These Section 2 Amendments also provide
an appropriate and reasonable remedy for overcoming the efthis past purposeful discrimination against
fects of 243
minorities.
As an abstract matter, the objective of "overcoming the effects of
. . . past purposeful discrimination against minorities '"2 ' is a legitimate end "within the scope of the constitution."24 5 Upon
closer examination, however, its legitimacy becomes dubious. Initially, the meaning of the phrase "the [present] effects of this past
purposeful" 2 4 6 exclusion of minorities from opportunities to register and vote must be identified. The committee report states that
the effects of past purposeful discrimination are "the [continuing]
denial to minorities of equal access to the political processes."'2 47
To better understand this suggested continuing constitutional violation, the concept of denial of "equal access to the political
processes" must be examined.
The committee report cites Kirksey v. Boardof Sufpervisors,24s
as an example of past purposeful exclusion of minorities from opportunities to register and vote, which exclusion has been perpetuated in the form of unequal access for minorities to the political
processes. Kirksey involved an action brought by black residents
of Hinds County, Mississippi, challenging the implementation of a
redistricting plan for the county board of supervisors and other
county officers. 249 The Fifth Circuit, on rehearing en banc, struck
down the plan as an unconstitutional continuation of a purposeful
denial of access to the political process. 25 0 In striking down the
redistricting plan, the Fifth Circuit looked to the factors delineated in White v. Regester25 1 as indicative of a denial of access to
the political process:
243. House REPORT, supra note 5, at 31.
244. Id.
245. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 316,421 (1819). Seesupra note 212 and

accompanying text.
246. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31.
247. Id.
248. 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).

249. Id. at 140-42.
250. Id. at 151.
251. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). For a discussion of White, see supra text accompanying notes
84-92.
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a history of official racial discrimination which touched the
right of the minority to register and vote and to participate in
the democratic process. .. ; a historical pattern of a disproportionately low number of minority group members being elected
to the legislative body. . .; a lack of responsiveness on the part
of elected officials to the needs of the minority community .;
a depressed socioeconomic status which makes participation in
community processes difficult. . .; and rules requiring a majority vote as a prerequisite to nomination ....

The committee report also delineates factors relevant to a violation of the results test and, like the court in Kirksey, bases these
factors on White v. Regester.253 The objective factors delineated
in the committee report, however, differ from those set forth in
Kirksey in two respects: First, the committee report explicitly
removes "responsiveness of elected officials to the minority community" from its list of factors relevant to a violation of the results
test;2 54 and second, the committee report makes no mention of the
depressed socioeconomic status of minorities. 2 "
The effect of these differences is significant. By excluding "responsiveness of elected officials" and omitting mention of minorities' socioeconomic conditions, the committee report's definition
of unequal access is confined to factors relating solely to whether
minorities are proportionally represented. Of the remaining three
factors listed in Kirksey2 56 , the only one which lends a definitive
meaning to unequal access is "a historical pattern of a disproportionately low number of minority group members being elected to
the legislative body. ' 257 In sum, given the committee report's citation of Kirksey as an example of unequal access to the political
252. Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 143. The court in Kirksey stated further. "By proof of an
aggregation of at least some of these factors, or similar ones, a plaintiff can demonstrate
that the members of a particular group in question are being denied access." Id.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 161-69.
254. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
255. See id.
256. The remaining factors are: (1) "a history of official racial discrimination which
touched the right of the minority to register and vote and to participate in the democratic
process"; (2) "a historical pattern of a disproportionately low number of minority group
members being elected to the legislative body"; and (3) "rules requiring a majority vote as
a prerequisite to nomination. Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 143.
257. Id. It is difficult to envision how "a history of official racial discrimination which
touched the right of the minority to register and vote and to participate in the democratic
process" would help to define the present constitutional wrong of unequal access. As Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality in Bolden, stated, "[P]ast discrimination cannot, in the
manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful." 446 U.S.
at 74. It is also difficult to understand how "rules requiring a majority vote as a prerequisite to nomination" can constitute a constitutional violation.
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process, the report's removal of official responsiveness from consideration, and its omission of socioeconomic conditions from its
list of factors relevant to a violation, the committee report defines
unequal access to the political process as a lack of proportional
representation of minorities.2 58
Thus, the constitutionality of the results test as an end depends
upon whether the remedying of this unequal access-the lack of
proportional representation-is a constitutionally legitimate end.
The Court, however, has never recognized lack of proportional
representation as a per se constitutional violation.2 5 9 The Court
has recognized only that a consideration of race or ethnicity may
be employed in setting up electoral districts which remedy situations where purposeful minority vote dilution has occurred or
where Congress has determined that a risk of such purposeful dilution exists.2 60 Before it may be concluded, however, that the results test's objective of remedying disproportionate representation
is unconstitutional, it must be determined whether Congress, on
its own, may determine what constitutes a fourteenth amendment
violation.
The issue of congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment is a controversial one and is far from settled.2 6 '
Katzenbach v. Morgan262 is often cited as the source of this con-

troversy. The plaintiffs in Morgan brought suit challenging section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act 263 insofar as it pro tanto
258. See supra text accompanying notes 145-5 1.
259. See supra text accompanying note 82. The disclaimer in the results test language
requires something extra besides a statistical absence of proportional representation, but
the lack of proportional representation would be the primary factor. See supra note 152

and accompanying text.
260. See, eg., United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 180-87. Congress has determined
that a risk of purposeful voting discrimination exists in jurisdictions covered by § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. See supra text accompanying note 228.
261. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrtrrlONAL LAW § 5-14 (1978).
262. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See generally Buchanan, Katzenbach v. Morgan and CongressionalEnforcement Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment: .4 Study in Conceptual

Confusion, 17 Hous. L. REv. 69 (1979) (argues that Congress, under the rubric of"promoting 14th amendment values," may prohibit state action which is not prohibited by the 14th
amendment's self-executing force).
263. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976). The full text of
section 4(e) is as follows:
(1) Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the fourteenth
amendment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom language was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the
States from conditioning the right to vote of such persons on ability to read, write,
understand, or interpret any matter in the English language.
(2) No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth pri-
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prohibited the enforcement of the election laws of New York re-

quiring an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. 2 4 The Court, however, upheld section 4(e) as "a proper
exercise of the power
granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth
5
Amendment.

' 26

The Court upheld section 4(e) on two alternative theories, the
second of which is relevant to Congress' power to define constitutional violations.2 6 6 Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion of the
Court, argued that Congress could have independently concluded
that New York's English language literacy test violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,2 6 7 notwithstanding a judgment by the Court seven years earlier that literacy tests
do not per se violate the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.2 6 8
In the words of one commentator, the "novelty [of this theory] lay
in the assumed claim of Congress to the post of constitutional
interpreter.

26 9

The Morgan Court affirmed Congress' power to invalidate a
state electoral law even though the Court had previously held that
mary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any state or
territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in
which the predominant classroom language was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language,
except that in States in which State law provides that a different level of education
is presumptive of literacy, he shall demonstrate that he has successfully completed
an equivalent level of education in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than
English.
Id.
264. Id. at 643-44.
265. Id. at 646.
266. The first theory viewed § 4(e) as a constitutional means rather than as a legitimate
end. Id. at 652-53.
267. Id. at 653-56.
268. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
Regarding Lassiter, the Court in Morgan stated:
[O]ur task in this case is not to determine whether the New York English literacy
requirement as applied to deny the right to vote to a person who successfully
completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Accordingly, our decision in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd . . .
sustaining the North Carolina English literacy requirement as not in all circumstances prohibited by the first sections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, is inapposite ....
Lassiter did not present the question before us here:
Without regard to whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection
Clause itself nullifies New York's English literacy requirement as so applied,
could Congress prohibit the enforcementof the state law by legislating under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment?
384 U.S. at 649.
269. L. TRIBE, supra note 261, at 266.
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literacy tests are not per se invalid. Thus, it may be argued that
Congress can legitimately declare state electoral laws to be invalid
under the results test even though in Whitcomb v. Chavis the
Court declared that electoral laws which fail to produce proportional representation are not per se invalid.27 ° Morgan, therefore,
appears to support the constitutionality of the results test. The
precedential impact of Morgan, however, is questionable for two
reasons.
First, it is reasonable to distinguish the election law construed
in Morgan from the results test, notwithstanding the broad language of Justice Brennan's opinion in Morgan. The test, as set
forth by Justice Brennan, is that a congressional enactment extending the reach of the fourteenth amendment is constitutional if
the Court can "perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment that [a particular state law]. . . was an invidious
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. ' 27 1 In
Morgan the Court may have deferred to Congress' expansion of
the reach of the fourteenth amendment because Congress was extending an existing basic right-the right to vote-to a class of
citizens previously excluded from that right.2 72 The results test, on
the other hand, would create in effect a new right, the right to a
degree of proportional representation.27 3 Thus, it might be argued
that though Morgan, on its face, supports the constitutionality of
the results test, the substantive differences between Morgan and
the proposed results test render Morgan inapposite to the issue of
whether the proposed results test is a constitutionally legitimate
end.
The second basis upon which the relevance of Morgan to the
results test may be questioned is the Morgan decision's lack of
precedential impact. Congressional power to expand the reach of
the fourteenth amendment was only one of the theories by which
the Court upheld section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act. 274 The
Court's other theory viewed section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act
as a constitutional means rather than as a legitimate end.2 75 As
270.
271.
272.
273.

See 403 U.S. 124 (1971); supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656.
See supra text accompanying note 263.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-207. The right would not be absolute be-

cause of the disclaimer, but the absence of the proportional representation plus "something
extra" would establish a violation. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 267-69.
275. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-53.
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Justice Rehnquist has suggested,27 6 Morgan'sprecedential value is
therefore lessened because the Court did not solely rely upon the

theory of Congress-as-constitutional-interpreter.
Morgan's precedential value is further lessened by the subsequent case of Oregon v. Mitchell.2 77 Mitchell addressed, but failed
to answer conclusively, the Morgan issue of whether Congress has
the power to define constitutional violations. The issue arose in

the Court's determination of the constitutionality of one of the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970278 which granted 18-year-

olds the right to vote in both federal and state elections.
Congress justified the legislation on the theory that the equal
protection clause prohibits discrimination in suffrage between individuals aged 18 to 21 and individuals over 21.279 Thus, Congress assumed the power to expand the coverage of the fourteenth
amendment beyond the scope of prior judicial rulings as Morgan
had suggested it might do. The Court, however, ruled that although Congress could lower the voting age to 18 in federal elections, it could not do so in state elections.2"' The Court arrived at
this result in the following manner: four Justices concluded that
Congress could lower the voting age in both federal and state elections;2 8' four Justices concluded that Congress could not lower the
276. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 220 n.8 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
277. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
278. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 302, 84 Stat. 314,
318. Section 302 provides:
Except as required by the Constitution, no citizen of the United States who is
otherwise qualified to vote in any State or political subdivision in any primary or
in any election shall be denied the right to vote in any such primary or election on
account of age if such citizen is eighteen years of age or older.
279. The congressional findings accompanying § 302 stated that a requirement that a
voter be 21 years old:
(1) denies and abridges the inherent constitutional rights of citizens eighteen years
of age but not yet twenty-one years of age to vote-a particularly unfair treatment
of such citizens in view of the national defense responsibilities imposed upon such
citizens;
(2) has the effect of denying to citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twentyone years of age the due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution; and
(3) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest.
Id. § 301, 84 Stat. at 318.
280. Justice Black announced the judgment of the Court. Oregon, 400 U.S. at 118.
281. Justice Douglas, in his opinion, stated: "The grant of the franchise to 18-year-olds
by Congress is in my view valid across the board." Id. at 135. Justice Douglas went on to
say, "Congress might well conclude that a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 was
needed in the interest of equal protection." Id. at 141. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, joining together in an opinion, stated:
We believe there is serious question whether a statute granting the franchise to
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voting age in any election, federal or state; 282 and Justice Black
concluded that Congress had the power to lower the voting age in
federal but not in state elections 2 3 -a proposition which all eight
of the other Justices rejected. In the words of one commentator,
"The Court's 'last word' (so far) on this issue is thus quite literally
incomprehensible."28 4
citizens 21 and over while denying it to those between the ages of 18 and 21 could,
in any event, withstand present scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Regardless of the answer to this question, however, it is clear to us that proper regard
for the special function of Congress in making determinations of legislative fact
compels this Court to respect those determinations unless they are contradicted by
evidence far stronger than anything that has been adduced in these cases. We
would uphold § 302 as a valid exercise of congressional power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 240.
282. Justice Stewart, in an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
joined, stated: "Congress was wholly without constitutional power to alter-for the purpose of any elections---the voting age qualifications now determined by the several States."
Id. at 282 (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, Stewart opined:
In my view, neither the Morgan case, nor any other case upon which the Government relies, establishes such congressional power, even assuming that all those
cases were rightly decided. Mr. Justice Black is surely correct when he writes,
"... It is obvious that the whole Constitution reserves to the States the power to
set voter qualifications in state and local elections, except to the limited extent
that the people through constitutional amendments have specifically narrowed
the powers of the States.". . . [Ilt is equally plain to me that the Constitution just
as completely withholds from Congress the power to alter by legislation qualifications for voters in federal elections, in view of the explicit provisions of Article I,
Article II, and the Seventeenth Amendment.
Id. at 293-94. Justice Harlan, in his opinion, stated: "I think that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear beyond any reasonable doubt that no part of the legislation now under review can be upheld as a legitimate exercise of congressional power under
that Amendment." Id. at 155.
283. Justice Black stated:
mhe responsibility of the States for setting the qualifications of voters in congressional elections was made subject to the power of Congress to make or alter such
Moreover, the power of Conregulations if it deemed it advisable to do so ....
gress to make election regulations in national elections is augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Id. at 119-20. Justice Black further commented:
In short, the Constitution allotted to the States the power to make laws regarding national elections, but provided that if Congress became dissatisfied with the
I would hold, as have a long line of
state laws, Congress could alter them....
decisions in this Court, that Congress has ultimate supervisory power over congressional elections. Similarly, it is the prerogative of Congress to oversee the
conduct of presidential and vice-presidential elections and to set the qualifications
for voters for electors for those offices. It cannot be seriously contended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over
congressional elections.
On the other hand, the Constitution was also intended to preserve to the States
the power that even the Colonies had to establish and inaintain their own separate and independent governments, except insofar as the Constitution itself commands otherwise.
Id. at 123-24 (footnotes omitted).
284. L. TRIBE, supra note 248L, at 267.
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Morgan, therefore, is not a solid precedent on which to base
Congress' power to enact the results test for three reasons: (1) the
reach of Morgan beyond its own factual situation is unclear;285 (2)
it did not solely rely on the theory of Congress-as-constitutionalinterpreter;2 86 and (3) subsequent cases have failed to clarify its
precedential impact.2 87 The issue of when Congress may expand
the reach of the fourteenth amendment is still an open question.
Because the results test creates a significant new fourteenth
amendment right to a degree of proportional representation, it
would seem wise to heed Justice Harlan's compelling argument:
In Article V, the Framers expressed the view that the political
restraints on Congress alone were an insufficient control over
the process of constitution making. The concurrence of twothirds of each House and of three-fourths of the States was
needed for the political check to be adequate. To allow a simple majority of Congress to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is therefore fundamentally
out of
288
keeping with the constitutional structure.
In sum, the constitutionality of the results test is questionable
in light of both its stated objectives. Its constitutionality may be
attacked as a means of preventing purposeful voting discrimination because it may potentially strike down a great many constitutionally legitimate state statutes. 28 9 It may also be attacked in its
capacity as an end because it expands the reach of the fourteenth
amendment into an area already explicitly avoided by the
Supreme Court.2 9 ° Moreover, the theory that Congress may expand the substantive reach of the fourteenth amendment lacks
solid precedential authority 291 and as a matter of constitutional
policy is unwise.
IV.
A.

POLITICAL ANALYSIS

The PoliticalPhilosophy Behind the Results Test

The proponents of the results test believe that the "denial to
285. See supra text accompanying notes 271-73.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 274-76.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 277-84.
288. Oregon, 400 U.S. at 205 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
also SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 51, at 63-65 (arguing that Congress lacks authority to

enact the results test).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 213-42.

290. See supra text accompanying notes 259-60.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 271-84.
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minorities of equal access to the political process"2 92 will be reme2 93
died by fostering the proportional representation of minorities.
This view of the problem and its solution are based on the assumption that minorities do not have access to the political process if they are not represented by members of their own minority
group.29 4 The results test proponents, therefore, argue that electoral schemes which result in the consistent defeat of minority candidates by bloc voting majorities over a substantial period of time
should be replaced with electoral schemes which have a better
chance of producing proportional representation. Thus, the fundamental premise of their argument is that aperson who is not a
member ofa racialor languageminority group will not representthe
interestsof that minority group. This premise is composed of two
elements: (1) that racial and language minority groups have interests unique to themselves; and (2) that people who are not members of a particular minority group will not represent those
interests.29 5
1. Group Representation
The committee report impliedly supports the idea that minorities have unique group interests, by explicitly referring to "the interests of a racial or language minority. '2 96 The idea of group
representation in the state legislatures, however, runs counter to
existing constitutional principles. Indeed, Reynolds v.
Sims-which the proponents of the results test erroneously cite as
the fountainhead of the minority vote dilution principle 97 --supports the idea that it is individuals who are represented
in our state legislatures: "Legislators are people, not trees or
acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. 2 98
Several Supreme Court opinions discuss the problems which
might arise from the adoption of the concept of minority group
292. See supra text accompanying notes 244-58.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 145-92.
294. The reference in the committee report to "[nonminority] candidate identified with
the interests of a racial or language minority" is merely a smoke screen. See supra text
accompanying notes 154-57.
295. Id.
296. House REPORT, supra note 5, at 30 (1981) (emphasis added).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60. Contra Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Gerrymanders, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 845 (1978) (arguing that Reynolds actually

spawned the legal principle of group voting rights).
298. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
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representation. In Whitcomb, the Court discussed the difficulty of
containing a principle of group representation:
[A standard] guaranteeing one racial group representation...
is expressive of the more general proposition that any group
with distinctive interests must be represented in legislative halls
if it is numerous enough to command at least one seat and represents a majority living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single-member district. This approach would make it
difficult to reject claims of Democrats, Republicans, or members of any political organization. . . . There are also union
oriented workers, the university community, religious or ethnic
groups occupying indentiflable areas of our heterogeneous cities and urban areas.299
Members of the Court have also questioned the wisdom of
molding our electoral laws around racial and language minority
interests. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Wright v.
Rockefeller, pointed out that racial divisiveness can be generated
by drawing legislative district lines on the basis of racial interests:
When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks
to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that
relate to race or to religion rather than to political issues are
generated; communities seek not the best representative but the
best racial or religious partisan. Since that system is at3 war
with the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here. 00
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in UnitedJewish Organizations documented the potential for racial and ethnic animosity generated
by racial gerrymandering:
[T]hose described as "nonwhites" include, in addition to Negroes, a substantial portion of Puerto Ricans. The Puerto Rican population . . . has expressly disavowed any identity of
interest with the Negroes, and, in fact, objected to the 1974 redistricting scheme because it did not30establish a Puerto Rican
controlled district within the county. 1
In addition to the problems of containing the group representation idea and the potential divisiveness of drawing district lines
on the basis of minority demography, there is no clear ambit of
"minority group interests." Past and present discrimination cer299. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 156-57. Put cf.Note, supra note 180, at 57 (arguing for the
recognition of group voting rights which would be limited to racial groups by the parameters of the 15th amendment). For a discussion of /iitcomb, see supra text accompanying
notes 76-83.
300. Wright, 376 U.S. at 67. For a discussion of Wright, see supra note 94.
301. United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 185. For a discussion of UnitedJewish
Organizations,see supra text accompanying notes 180-87.
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tainly provides members of a minority group with a common interest in lobbying for governmental efforts to eliminate such
discrimination. There is, however, little reason to assume that beyond the common interest of combatting discrimination, members
of minority groups will vote in a bloc. Indeed, Justice Stevens
asserted that such an assumption is an affront to members of minority groups:
Respect for the citizenry in the black community compels acceptance of the fact that in the long run there is no more certainty that these individuals will vote alike than will individual
members of any other ethnic, economic, or social group. The
probability df parallel voting fluctuates as the blend of political
issues affecting the outcome of an election changes from time to
time to emphasize one issue, or a few, rather than others, as
dominant. The facts that a political group has its own history,
has suffered its own special injustices, and has its own congeries

of special political interests, do not make one such group diffrent from any other in the eyes of the law.3 "2
2.

'Representation" of Minorities

Justice Stevens' observation calls into question the assumption
that people who are not members of a particular minority group
generally will not represent minority group interests-the second
element of the premise behind proportional representation. 30 3 If,
as Justice Stevens suggests, minority group interests are only a
small portion of the interests which form the political complexion
of the country, there is no reason why that assumption should
hold. It is groundless to argue that a white representative could
not represent the economic, environmental, health, and security
interests of black constituents, because those interests pertain to
people as people, not as members of a minority group. Moreover,
there is no basis for asserting that a nonminority representative
to the interests of minorities in combating
cannot be sensitive
3°
discrimination.
302. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 89 n.10.
303. See supra text accompanying note 295.
304. Indeed, the civil rights movement and the legislation which it has produced is

testimony to the sensitivity of many nonminority Americans to the plight of minorities. If
insensitivity was the norm, there would be no such legislation. This is certainly not to deny
the discrimination which exists today in our country. It is simply to attack as erroneous the
presumption that an individual is best represented by a member of his or her racial or
ethnic group. See also SUBcoMM. REPORT, .upra note 51, at 42. Cf.THE FEDERALIST No.
35 (A. Hamilton) (arguing that in a free society there can never be-nor would it be desira-

ble that there be-a situation where each class of society is represented by one of its own).
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Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Rome v. United States, attacked the idea that good representation requires proportional
representation. He noted that blacks who had testified in Rome
had expressed no dissatisfaction with white representation, but
30 5
merely a preference to be represented by blacks.
Thus, the results test, as a matter of public policy, could have
adverse ramifications. The results test is based on the goal of
group representation which is antithetical to the prevailing standard of individual voting rights, could be difficult to contain to
particular groups, is potentially divisive, and erroneously assumes
that racial and ethnic minorities stand together as interest groups
across the complex of issues dividing our society. Moreover, the
results test is based on the invalid assumption that racial and ethnic minorities are best represented by members of their own minority group.
B.

Ramifications of the Results Test On ConstitutionalStructure

While the results test would promote proportional representation of minorities, 0 6 representation by nonminority candidates
"identified with the interests of a racial or language minority"
would purportedly satisfy the results test as well.3 7 In litigating
section 2 cases, courts accordingly would have to determine which
nonminority candidates in a challenged jurisdiction have been
"identified with the interests of [minorities]." Such determinations
might breach the Constitution's separation of powers.
There are two possible approaches the courts could use in ruling on which candidates identify with the interests of minorities.
First, they could use a statistical approach-a factual determination of which candidates a bloc voting minority group has voted
for. It is something of a political leap of faith, however, to assume
that because a candidate has been endorsed by a political group
that he or she is necessarily identified with the interests of that
minority group. In order to ascertain a more substantive identification, a court might engage in a second approach, which would
seek to determine what minority interests are and how a particular
305. Rome, 446 U.S. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 145-5 1.
307. The House Judiciary Committee Report defines minority vote dilution as the situation where "a bloc voting majority over a substantial period of time consistently . . .
defeat[s] minority candidates or candidatesidentified with the interestsof a racialor language
minority." House REPORT, supra note 5, at 30 (1981) (emphasis added). But see supra text
accompanying notes 154-57.
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candidate's platform and past record in office stood in relation to
those interests. This would breach the separation of powers 3by
08
requiring judicial determinations on strictly political issues.
Apparently recognizing this problem, the committee report, states
that the results test will not impose on the courts the task of ruling
on subjective political issues, such as responsiveness to minority
interests.3 °9
To enforce the results test, courts will be involved in striking
down states' multimember electoral schemes pursuant to federal

law, and in setting up alternative electoral systems. This could
have deleterious effects on the nation's federal structure. Indeed,
it can be argued that a state's power to determine its own form of

electoral structure is the most important element of the state's independent sovereignty.310 Thus, the doctrine of federalism suggests that the question of whether to adopt single-member as

opposed to multimember electoral schemes is a choice to be made
by the citizens and legislatures of each state. 1
308. For a general discussion of the importance of the Constitution's separation of

powers, see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48, 51 (J. Madison).
309. See supra text accompanying note 157.
310. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Justice Black stated in Mitchell:
No function is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the
States and their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the
Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for filling local public offices.
Id. at 125.
311. The committee report views multimember districts as undesirable due to their tendency to "dilute" the votes of minorities: "Numerous empirical studies based on data collected from many communities have found a strong link between at-large elections and
lack of minority representation." HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30 (1981). Many reasons, however, have been set forth in support of multimember districts including: (I) their
tendency to focus represtantives' attention toward more broad-based concerns; (2) a similar
tendency to focus voters' attention toward general community issues; (3) avoidance of gerrymandering; and (4) less difficulty in complying with the one-person, one-vote requirement. See Holt v. Richardson, 240 F. Supp. 724, 727 (D. Hawaii 1965). Even in terms of
representing minority interests per se, the proposition that single-member districts are inherently preferable to multimember districts is questionable. Under a single-member
scheme, a member of a minority group likely will be elected to a governing body, but will
then be a minority in that governing body. Under a multimember scheme, however, a bloc
voting minority group could constitute swing votes in the election of all the representatives.
Which electoral scheme benefits minority groups more is less than obvious and, as such, is
a political issue which should be left to the voters of each state-not to the judiciary. For a
stark example of the disagreement over whether controlling power in one district or swing
power in several districts is desirable, see Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), where
plaintiffs "prefer[red] a more even distribution of minority groups among the four congressional districts," but incumbent minority politicians, as intervenors in the case, "argue[d]
strenuously that the kind of districts for which [plaintiffs] contended would be undesirable
"Id. at 58. See also Dantzler, ElectoralLaw: Multimember Districts, 1978 ANN.
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In sum, the results test poses two potentially profound ramifications for the nature of the nation's constitutional structure.
First, the results test may cause the constitutional separation of
powers to be breached by asking the courts to rule on what legislation is desirable for minority groups and which candidates have
adequately supported that legislation.3? 1 2 Second, the results test
may impair the nation's federal structure by giving the judiciary
the ability to disestablish state electoral schemes pursuant to federal law.31 3
CONCLUSION

The concern which gives rise to the proposal to add a results
test to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is the continuing unequal
application of our nation's laws to racial and language minorities.
The motivation behind the results test is the belief that by ensuring a degree of proportional representation, minorities will be
well-represented and will finally be guaranteed equal protection
of the laws. 314 But rather than ameliorating discrimination, the
results test threatens to encourage it.
The results test would be unable to fulfill its objective of ensuring equal application of the laws to minorities because the test is
based on the fallacy that a black representative would necessarily
be an effective representative for black constituents and conversely, that a white representative probably would not be an effective representative for black constituents.3 15 A representative's
effectiveness, however, depends on his or her individual sincerity
and competence. A belief that a representative's race or ethnicity
is a measure of his or her effectiveness has no place in a society
struggling to rid itself of prejudice.
In addition to the results test's inherent ineffectiveness in
achieving its goals, the test might actually cause a worsening of
discrimination in our nation because it would institutionalize race
and language minority status in the national voting laws.31 6 The
underlying standard of proportional representation could, in effect, force state legislatures to draw their electoral district lines on
SuRv. AM. L. 91 (discussing the judiciary's inconclusiveness about the relative desirability
of multimember districts).
312. See supra text accompanying notes 306-09.
313. See supra text accompanying note 310.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 244-58.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 303-05.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 300-01.
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the basis of race and language minority status.3 17 But as Chief
Justice Burger observed in United Jewish Organizations, the

proper remedy for racial and ethnic bias in districting is to reapportion districts along neutral lines.318
The source of the problem of unequal application of the laws
is not the lack of proportional representation. While the problem
prior to enactment of the Voting Rights Act was the absence of
representation, the problem today is not the lack of proportional
representation, but rather, the problem of insensitive or unresponsive representation. The remedies are, therefore, concerted political action to achieve responsiveness and targeted legal action 319
aimed at individual instances of insensitivity and outright bigotry.
Granted, these remedies are slow and piecemeal compared to the
results test's alluring aim of achieving "better" representation in
one single stroke. The results test, however, would not guarantee
better representation 320 and could result in reinforcing the racial
of the
and ethnic antagonisms which the civil rights movement
321
last generation has fought so hard to eliminate.
ADDENDUM: THE REVISED VERSION OF SENATE BILL

1992

The Senate Judiciary Committee, on May 4, 1982, adopted
new language for the amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.322 The following analysis of the new S. 1992 language323
concludes that it may be viewed as either similar to the H.R. 3112
results test passed by the House of Representatives 324, or it may be
317. See supra text accompanying notes 175-92.
318. 430 U.S. at 186 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). But see Martin, The Questfor Racial
Representation in Legislative Apportionment, 21 How. L.J. 455, 478-79 (1978) (criticizing

Burger's statement and arguing for proportional representation of racial minorities).
319. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 303-05.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 300-01.
322. The new language was adopted by a vote of fourteen to four. Dole Paves Wayfor
Voting Rights Collapse, HuMAN EvENTs 3 (May 15, 1982).
323. "New S.1992 language" refers to the language adopted by the Senate Judiciary
Committee on May 4, 1982 to amend section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Prior to the
Judiciary Committee's action, the "old S.1992" proposal to amend section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act had been identical to the H.R. 3112 language. See supra text accompanying
note 12.
324. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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viewed as an evidentiary rule consistent with, though not identical
to, the existing intent standard followed by the courts. 325 The former interpretation raises the same policy and constitutional
problems inherent in the H.R. 3112 legislation,3 2 6 while the latter
interpretation avoids those problems and is therefore more
compelling.
The new language of S. 1992 changes section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965327 by substituting the following language:
Sec. 2(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on
the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the state or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one "circumstance" which may be considered, provided that nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population.328
The first sentence of the new Senate language is identical to
the H.R. 3112 language 32 except for the addition of the qualifier,
"as provided in subsection b." Subsection (b) is substituted for
the disclaimer language of H.R. 3112.330 The final clause of the
new Senate language--"nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population"-is substantively the same,
since both disclaimers essentially provide that the amendment is
not meant to establish an absolute right to proportional represen325. See supra text accompanying notes 76-131.
326. For an analysis of the policy problems inherent in the H.R. 3112 legislation see
supra text accompanying notes 292-313. For an analysis of the constitutional problems see
supra text accompanying notes 208-91.
327. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1905) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973-1973bb-1 (1976)).
328. S. 1992, as amended, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1982).
329. See supra text accompanying note 12.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
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tation. 3 ' When examining the remaining language of subsection

(b) it is readily apparent that it is taken, almost verbatim, from
332

White v. Regester.
As shown above,3 33 White was an ambiguous decision. While
the judicial standard applied in the decision regarding Dallas
County appears to have been an intent test, the decision regarding
Bexar County was based on judicial findings concerning a variety

of factors not employed to prove intentional discriminatory use of
the electoral process.
The differing standards employed in White manifest different
approaches to the role of proportional representation in discrimi-

nation cases. The disestablishment of the Dallas County multimember district and its replacement with single-member districts
exemplifies a view of proportional representation as a remedy for
the purposeful exclusion of minorities from the electoral process.

The decision was based on the implicit recognition that where an
electoral structure is being purposefully used to exclude a minority group from the political process, the only remedy is to dises-

tablish that electoral structure and replace it with one which
ensures that some members of the minority group can be elected
to office, despite the ill intentions of the majority.334 The disestab331. The fact that neither H.R. 3112 nor the new version of S. 1992 establishes an
absolute right to proportional representation does little to diffuse the opposition to amending section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, since the issue remains as to what must be shown in
addition to a lack of proportional representation in order to establish a violation of section
2.
332. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). The new S. 1992 language was drawn from the following
language in White:
The plaintiff's burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did
other residents of the district to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice.
Id. at 766.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 84-92.
334. This implicit recognition by the Court may be drawn from the following language:
[The Dallas Committee for Responsible Government (DCRG)] did not need the
support of the Negro community to win elections in the county, and it did not
therefore exhibit good-faith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations of the Negro community. The court found that as recently as 1970 the
DCRG was relying upon "racial campaign tactics in white precincts to defeat
candidates who had the overwhelming support of the black community." [343 F.
Supp.], at 727. Based on the evidence before it, the District Court concluded that
"the black community has been effectively excluded from participation in the
Democratic primary selection process," [343 F. Supp.], at 726, and was therefore
generally not permitted to enter into the political process in a reliable and meaningful manner. These findings and conclusions are sufficient to sustain the District
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lishment of the multimember district in Bexar County, however,

exemplifies the different view of proportional representaton as a
remedy for general discrimination.3 3 5

Since the S. 1992 language was drawn from White, 336 its operative impact will depend on whether it is interpreted in light of

the Dallas County decision or the Bexar County decision. If S.
1992 is interpreted in light of the Dallas County analysis, it will
stand as an evidentiary rule manifesting congressional intent with
regard to proof of discriminatory purpose. It would, in effect,
serve as a congressional adoption of Justice White's dissent to
Bolden, which recognized an intent standard but objected to the
plurality's point-by-point invalidation of the evidence introduced

by plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent. 337 The "totality of circumstances" test would stand as a congressional direction to

courts to look at evidence as a totality, rather than piece-by-piece,
when determining whether discriminatory intent has been proven.
Under such an analysis, the absence of proportional representa-

tion would simply constitute one type of evidence, amid the totality, which could be used to prove intentional discrimination. 338

Interpreting the S.1992 language in light of the Bexar County
analysis would produce a very different operative impact for the

legislation. Under a Bexar County analysis, plaintiffs would be
able to prove an "exclusion" from the political process without
proving intent.33 9 Therefore, evidence of a lack of proportional
Court's judgment with respect to the Dallas multimember district and, on this
record, we have no reason to disturb them.
412 U.S. at 767. Single-member districts were therefore sustained by the Court as an appropriate remedy for the condition of "not [being] permitted to enter into the political
process in a reliable and meaningful manner."
335. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
336. See supra note 332.
337. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 94-103 (1980). Justice White stated, in part:
Although the totality of the facts relied upon by the District Court to support its
inference of purposeful discrimination is even more compelling than that present
in White v. Regester, the plurality today rejects the inference of purposeful discrimination apparently because each of the factors relied upon by the courts below is alone insufficient to support the inference. . . . By viewing each of the
factors relied upon below in isolation, and ignoring the fact that racial bloc voting
at the polls makes it impossible to elect a black commissioner under the at-large
system, the plurality rejects the "totality of the circumstances" approach we endorsed in White v. Regester...
Id at 103.
338. The issue of what additional evidence would be required to prove purposeful use
of an electoral structure to exclude minorities from the political process would have to be
settled on a case-by-case basis.
339. The Court in White pointed to the district court's judgment that plaintiffs "are
effectively removed from the political processes of Bexar [County] ..
" 412 U.S. at 769.
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representation, together with some general evidence of discrimination, would be sufficient to establish a violation, thereby allowing judicial restructuring of the electoral system in order to
produce proportional representation.34 ° Put another way, while
under a Dallas County analysis, a totality of evidence would have
to reach the threshold of proving intent in order to establish a
violation, there is no objective evidentiary threshold under a
Bexar County analysis. 341 The judge could make a subjective determination of whether proportional representation is needed in a
given situation to remedy a group's alienation from the political
process. Interpreting the S.1992 language under a Bexar County
analysis therefore produces the same substantive amendment as
the H.R. 3112 version passed by the House of Representatives.
For example, under either an H.R. 3112 analysis or a Bexar
County analysis, lack of proportional representation, plus racial or
ethnic bloc voting, could be viewed by a judge as an "exclusion"
of a minority from the political process, thus warranting creation
342
of single-member districts or redrawing of existing district lines.
It may be argued that the suggested Dallas County analysis is
unreasonable in that proponents of a "results test" cannot be interpreted to have proposed legislation consistent with an "intent"
standard. It should be recalled that the legislative initiative to
amend section 2 of the Voting Rights Act arose out of opposition
to the plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden.343 There were two
strong dissents to Bolden. Justice White's dissent acknowledgedan
intent standardbut objected to the plurality's failure to look at the
evidence as a totality. 34 This is a Dallas County analysis. Justice
Marshall's dissent to Bolden went further and argued that intent is
not a requirement for proving a constitutional violation, thus giving judges wide discretion in determining when an electoral strucThe danger of finding violations on the basis of effective exclusion as opposed to purposeful exclusion is that the former standard is more subjective than the latter.
340. The new language of S. 1992 provides only that lack of proportional representation is "one 'circumstance' which may be considered." See supra text accompanying note

328. Beyond this, there is no guidance as to what type or degree of additional evidence is
required to constitute a violation.
341. In other words, proof of intent is a more objective standard for establishing a
violation than is "effective exclusion." Without this burden of having to prove intent in
minority vote dilution cases, there would be virtually no parameters on a judge's discretion
to find violations.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 132-207.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
344. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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ture is unconstitutional. 345 This is a Bexar County analysis. Both
approaches dissent to the plurality opinion in Bolden346 and are

therefore equally viable interpretations of legislation designed to
alter the plurality's ruling in Bolden.34 7
Though both interpretations of the S. 1992 language are viable, there are crucial distinctions between them. The Bexar
County approach presents the same profound policy and constitutional problems as the H.R. 3112 legislation. 34 The Dallas
County approach avoids these policy and constitutional problems.
Thus, when the S.1992 language reaches the courts, a responsible
judicial application of S.1992 would be to adopt the Dallas

County approach. Moreover, because the legislation passed the
Senate Judiciary Committee as a "compromise bill," the legislation may be presumed to avoid some of the highly-debated policy
problems posed by the H.R. 3112 test.
CHARLES

S.

KONIGSBERG

345. 446 U.S. at 103-41. Justice Marshall stated, in part: "In my view, our vote-dilution decisions require only a showing of discriminatory impact to justify the invalidation of
a multimember districting scheme, and, because they are premised on the fundamental
interest in voting protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the discriminatory-impact standard adopted by them is unaffected by Washington v. Davis .
Id at 104.
346. 446 U.S. at 58-83.
347. For an expression of support of the White standard by a proponent of the
amendment to § 2, see Extension ofthe Voting Rights Act: HearingsBefore the Subcomrt
on Civil and ConstitutionalRights 0/the Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2053
(1981).
348. See supra text accompanying notes 208-313. Lest the unconstitutionality of the
approach based on a Supreme Court holding be challenged as illogical, it should be noted
that the Bexar County portion of the decision in White is inconsistent with the predominant body of law in minority vote dilution cases. See supra text accompanying notes
130-31. The necessity of proving intent in minority vote dilution cases was indeed affirmed
as a principle of constitutional law in Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).

